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UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES 
FREDERIC M. BLOOM* 
ABSTRACT 
By now, we almost expect Congress to fail. Nearly every time the 
federal courts announce a controversial decision, Congress issues a call to 
rein in “runaway” federal judges. And nearly every time Congress makes a 
“jurisdiction-stripping” threat, it comes to nothing. 
But if Congress’s threats possess little fire, we have still been distracted 
by their smoke. This Article argues that Congress’s noisy calls have 
obscured another potent threat to the “judicial Power”: the Supreme Court 
itself. On occasion, this Article asserts, the Court reshapes and abuses the 
“judicial Power”—not through bold pronouncements or obvious doctrinal 
revisions, but through something more inconspicuous, more discreet: the 
prescription of unconstitutional decisionmaking procedures. These 
decisionmaking procedures—what this Article calls “unconstitutional 
courses”—have attracted little sustained attention; their unexpected source 
and their subtle form make these “courses” too easy to ignore. Yet where 
Congress has so often failed, the Court has quietly succeeded. By charting 
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“unconstitutional courses,” the Court has refashioned the “judicial Power” 
in an untenable way.  
To show how, this Article examines what “unconstitutional courses” 
are, when the Court has charted them, and why these “courses” merit 
consideration. As a part of this analysis, this Article identifies two 
“unconstitutional courses,” one historic and one contemporary. The first 
“course” grows out of Swift v. Tyson, a well-known (if long-derided) 
discussion of federal common law; the second emerges in Williams v. 
Taylor, a significant chapter in the story of contemporary habeas law. Both 
Swift and Williams illustrate the importance of how courts make 
decisions—what law they consider, what facts they ignore, what analytical 
steps they take. Both Swift and Williams demonstrate the impact a court’s 
decisionmaking “course” may (and does) have in resolving individual 
disputes and in shaping the “judicial Power.” And both Swift and Williams 
exhibit the need to examine the Court’s less obvious threats to individual 
rights—and to itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is little new glory in the battle over federal court power. In each 
bloodless clash, the patterns grow more familiar, the rhetoric more 
timeworn. Legislators rally to repel judicial efforts to “redefine our 
history.”1 Famous names—Michael Newdow,2 Terri Schiavo3—become 
code for judicial arrogance, emblems of supposedly “rogue” federal 
courts.4  
All the while, the ground beneath the federal courts’ relationship with 
Congress shifts. The relationship has never been easy.5 Almost from the 
 1. Carl Hulse, House Passes Court Limits on Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2004, at A17 (“‘We 
can’t let rogue judges redefine our history,’ Representative Steve Chabot, Republican of Ohio, said.”). 
 2. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 3. See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 957 (2005). 
 4. Hulse, supra note 1. 
 5. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Congress as Partner / Congress as Adversary, 22 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 85, 85–86 (1998). Article III of the United States Constitution invests the Supreme 
Court with “appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Congress’s power to make 
“Exceptions” and “Regulations” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction has, at times, been 
construed quite broadly, see generally Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869), and 
though the “Exceptions and Regulations” clause says nothing about congressional control over inferior 
federal court jurisdiction, Congress’s power to shape that jurisdiction has long been understood to be 
at least as expansive. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850) (acknowledging 
that Congress had no obligation to create lower federal courts in the first place, so it must have broad 
power to remove cases from their jurisdiction). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/1
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beginning, Congress and the courts have existed in a quarrelsome 
counterpoise, a state of anxious push-pull.6 This inter-institutional anxiety 
is never more apparent than when federal courts issue controversial 
decisions—like Newdow or Schiavo.7  
Some of these controversial decisions inspire angry legislative rhetoric, 
“threat[s]” intended to force “tactical [judicial] recessions.”8 Others 
prompt immediate popular discord9—occasionally so much so that we 
amend the Constitution.10 
And many of these decisions provoke a now-predictable congressional 
response: legislative attempts to curb federal court jurisdiction.11 The goal 
 
 
 6. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 49 (1980) 
(“Almost two hundred years of judicial review show many periods of serious popular and political 
disagreement with the Court’s work.”); id. at 130; see also Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? 
Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891, 894 (2002) (“We are again, at least 
ostensibly, in a [judicial] retreat phase.”) (citation omitted); cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power 
in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 361 (2000) (“Predictable and insistent 
cognitive pressures [] cause judges to press judicial prerogatives to implausible extremes.”). 
 7. I use the term “controversial” to denote some significant level of political or cultural 
unpopularity, not to indicate incorrectness (or correctness) as a matter of law. Cf. Gerald Gunther, 
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing 
Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896 (1984) (discussing “controversial federal court decisions”). 
 8. See CHOPER, supra note 6, at 57; ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA 
OF PROGRESS 94–95 (1970). For a brief discussion of a recent political “threat,” see Editorial, The 
Judges Made Them Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A22, recounting Senator John Cornyn’s claim 
that “distress about judges who ‘are making political decisions yet are unaccountable to the public 
. . . builds up and builds up to the point where some people engage in’ violence.” Senator Cornyn’s 
intemperate comments were widely criticized, but his remarks may reflect a strategy with a solid 
historical provenance. 
 9. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW chs. 1–3 (2004); CHOPER, supra note 6, at 128. 
 10. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 776 (1991) (“[T]he prospect of constitutional amendments reversing Court decisions might 
have substantially ameliorated the countermajoritarian difficulty had obtaining such amendments 
proven as easy as the eleventh amendment’s overruling of Chisholm v. Georgia. But this has not been 
the case; the Chisholm scenario has been repeated just three times in the Court’s history, and on one of 
these occasions only a civil war made the amendment possible.”) (citations omitted); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 46 (1980). 
 11. Proposals to strip federal courts of jurisdiction surface “in virtually every period of 
controversial federal court decisions.” Gunther, supra note 7, at 895–97 (listing jurisdiction-stripping 
efforts in the Marshall Court years, in the 1950s, and in more recent decades—the last in response to 
court decisions on “hot button” social issues like school prayer); see also David Currie, The Three-
Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1964) (“[E]very important 
decision . . . has brought forth a rash of irresponsible proposals to limit the Court’s jurisdiction. . . .”); 
David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 9 (1999). 
It may still be true, of course, that “people talk about wholesale jurisdiction-stripping far more than 
[Congress] actually do[es] it.” Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of 
Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 191 (2001). But when Justice O’Connor noted 
that the contemporary battles over the Court’s jurisdictional reach are not “new,” she could hardly 
have been standing on firmer historical ground. David Stout, 3 Justices Respond Personally To 
Criticism of U.S. Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at A18. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of these jurisdiction-stripping efforts is always the same: to scale back the 
power of federal judges.12 But the fate of these bills has rarely varied, and 
nearly all have failed to become law.13  
There may be a lesson in this history of congressional failure. The 
record may suggest that Congress’s serial “jurisdiction-stripping” efforts 
are little more than political theater, an easy (if polemical) way for 
legislators to score political points.14 It may even suggest that the federal 
courts are in no real danger, that the “judicial Power”15 is unthreatened—at 
least by Congress.  
But Congress is not the exclusive threat to the “judicial Power.” A 
significant portion of that role, this Article contends, has passed to a rather 
unlikely source: the Supreme Court itself. The Court has not adopted this 
role casually or conspicuously; its self-abnegating efforts appear only like 
“shadows on cave walls.”16 But these “shadows” are far from illusive; they 
are real and powerful, perhaps even more so than Congress’s direct and 
unambiguous attempts to curtail the power of the federal courts.  
In the last decade, the Court has accomplished what Congress has long 
been unable—because of political inability and because of the Court’s 
jealous protection of its own power17— to do itself: to shape the “judicial 
Power” in an untenable way. The Court has done so, unobtrusively 
enough, by prescribing unconstitutional decisionmaking procedures—that 
is, by charting what this Article calls “unconstitutional courses.”18  
 
 
 12. Not all of Congress’s attempts to restrict jurisdiction are functionally identical: Some sweep 
broadly, seeking to scale back the jurisdiction of all federal courts; some aim to limit Supreme Court 
jurisdiction in a specific subset of cases; still others target only the jurisdiction of inferior federal 
courts. 
 13. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 7, at 897. The exception is Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 506 (1868). 
 14. See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 969 (2002); see also Strauss, supra note 
6, at 908 (“The spectre of judges who might run amok has a distinguished political history in this 
country. . . .”); Hulse, supra note 1, at A17. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual 
Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 696 (1998). 
 16. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 696 (1974). 
 17. See generally CHOPER, supra note 6, at 380–415. 
 18. I borrow this appellation from Justice Reed. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91 
(1938) (Reed, J., concurring) (“The ‘unconstitutional’ course referred to in the majority opinion is 
apparently the ruling in Swift v. Tyson that the supposed omission of Congress to legislate as to the 
effect of decisions leaves federal courts free to interpret general law for themselves.”). Others have 
used the phrase “unconstitutional course” as well, though rarely in the way I use the term here—viz., 
as a metaphor for impermissible, Court-prescribed decisional methodologies. See Dennis J. 
Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the Japanese Exclusion 
Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 464 (2002) (“Judicial commitments become recorded as precedents. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/1
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Over the last half-century, the legal academy has examined countless 
aspects of federal court jurisdiction—so much so that the discipline may 
be, in the words of Professor Van Alstyne, “choking on redundancy.”19 
Some have engaged in famous dialectical exercises, drawing the parallel 
between “the power to regulate jurisdiction” and the “power to regulate 
rights.”20 Others have looked closely at the precarious nature of the Court-
Congress partnership, reminding that “Congress is not entitled to make 
itself the Court’s adversary.”21 Some have chronicled less obvious sources 
of congressional authority, spotting the many ways Congress “regulates 
the manner in which federal courts exercise their jurisdiction.”22 And still 
others have located the notion of “regulat[ing] rights” in broader 
institutional and historical context, stressing the “pointless[ness]” of 
judicial review in contexts where remedies are necessarily absent.23  
But very little of this “mountain of scholarship”24 examines the Court’s 
(generally modern) tendency to enfeeble its own “judicial Power.”25 And 
none of this work explores the Court’s occasional forging of 
“unconstitutional courses,” Court-prescribed but constitutionally 
impermissible methods of federal court decisionmaking. This Article 
attempts to fill these notable gaps—and to show how the two gaps fit 
together.  
 
 
The courts cannot be extricated from an unconstitutional course or unconstitutional principles rooted 
out of its practice merely by an election, as can be done in the case of the President or Congress.”); 
Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of “Congress” to Attack the “Jurisdiction” of 
“Federal Courts,” 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1409 (2000) (“I do not suggest that the Court will declare 
unconstitutional the ‘course’ it is ‘pursuing.’”) (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Undated Draft, Box 128 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)). 
 19. Professor Cole has made the same point in much the same way. See David Cole, Jurisdiction 
and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2481 (1998) (citing Gunther, supra note 7, at 897 n.9 (quoting a letter 
from Professor Van Alstyne to Professor Gunther (Feb. 28, 1983))). And as Professor Cole pithily 
noted, “[h]ere we go again”—as we do here, albeit in a different direction. Id. 
 20. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1371 (1953). 
 21. Sager, supra note 5, at 86 (emphasis omitted); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First 
Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1998) [hereinafter Klein’s First Principle]. 
 22. Lawson, supra note 11, at 191 (emphasis omitted) (referencing, e.g., John Harrison, The 
Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); Martin H. Redish, Federal 
Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995)). 
 23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 369–70 (1993); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair 
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
 24. Vermeule, supra note 6, at 358. 
 25. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 1421 (noting the “hostility of courts to themselves . . . a kind 
of judicial self-loathing”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To that end, this Article puts forward two primary claims. The first 
claim is largely theoretical: I argue that the Court occasionally requires 
federal courts to make decisions in unconstitutional ways— to adopt, that 
is, “unconstitutionally wrongheaded”26 decisionmaking procedures. With 
these “unconstitutional courses,” the central concern is not necessarily the 
outcome reached. The principal concern is how the court makes 
decisions—what law it considers, what facts it ignores, what analytical 
steps it takes. 
But if the problem is primarily one of process—if the Court’s 
“shadows” reflect means, not ends—are unconstitutional courses truly 
problematic? Are these supposed “unconstitutional courses” real, 
detectable, and important?  
This Article’s second claim is that unconstitutional courses do more 
than raise trivial questions about form and methodology; they raise 
legitimate and important questions about the operation of the federal 
courts and the scope of individual rights. In support, this Article examines 
two unconstitutional courses, one historic and one contemporary—and 
both quite prominent. The historic example reaches back to Swift v. Tyson, 
a decision that invited inferior federal courts to create a kind of federal 
common law.27 The more contemporary example concentrates on Williams 
v. Taylor, a decision that interprets central portions of the Anti-terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).28 In both Swift and Williams, 
this Article contends, the Court designed unconstitutional decisionmaking 
systems. And in one (viz., Williams) more than the other, the Court raised 
serious concerns about federal court integrity, individual litigants’ rights, 
and the Supreme Court’s conception of the “judicial Power.”29  
A few comments about the scope of this Article should be made at the 
outset. To start, it is important to stress that this piece does not pretend to 
explore every “unconstitutional course” that the Court has charted. It 
merely attempts to take the first step in a more comprehensive 
examination of these “courses,”30 using two salient examples to give the 
thesis more distinct shape.  
 
 
 26. See Lawson, supra note 11, at 211. 
 27. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). See also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 28. 529 U.S. 420 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000). 
 29. These functional, institutional, and structural ideas are explored at greater length, infra 
sections III and IV. Cf. Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2005) (ordering the government to “be 
prepared to give an indication” of section 2254(d)’s constitutionality “in light of Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)”); Irons v. 
Carey, No. 05-15275, order at 1-2 (9th Cir. May 18, 2005) (same). 
 30. Other “courses” may emerge in the Court’s Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/1
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It is equally important to stress this Article’s modest claim to 
originality in discussing the Court’s recent habeas jurisprudence. Since its 
passage, AEDPA—and the seismic shift in habeas jurisprudence it 
represents31—has proven an unusually fertile ground for debate.32 
Thoughtful, often clever readings of the statute’s text have been 
proposed;33 the habeas “mousetrap” has been redesigned;34 and AEDPA 
has been located in historical, social, and penological context.35 This piece 
will not revisit much of that work. Nor does this piece intend to offer an 
exhaustive account of Erie doctrine, judicial misallocation of 
decisionmaking authority, or the rights-remedies chasm. Rather, this 
Article aims to tease out a narrow, if far-reaching, jurisdictional idea, a 
thesis that touches directly on fundamental constitutional concerns.36  
This Article is separated into five parts. Part I develops the idea of an 
“unconstitutional course”—the notion that the Court has, on occasion, 
propounded impermissible and unconstitutional decisionmaking 
frameworks. As part I explains, not all contentious Supreme Court 
decisions blaze unconstitutional courses; indeed, very few do. But there 
exists a small subset of Supreme Court opinions that do more than require 
inferior federal courts to adhere to dubious—even subsequently 
 
 
doctrines. Cf. Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 636 (1993) (discussing 
the “[a]doption of the reasonableness standard” in these—and other—contexts). See also Louise 
Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609 
(2000) (positing Bush v. Gore as a kind of “unconstitutional course”—albeit one without obvious 
ancestry or progeny). 
 31. When a petition will be reviewed on the merits, how it would be considered, what claims may 
be presented, why a state court’s decision may be displaced—under AEDPA, the answers to all of 
these questions changed. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An 
(Opinionated) User’s Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 106–07 (1998). 
 32. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 19, at 2481; Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal 
Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211 (2004) 
(citing, e.g., Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 799–802 (1992); Barry 
Friedman, Pas De Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2467, 2467 
(1993); James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty?” AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital 
Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 414 (2001); James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty 
Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 333–36 (2002)); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus 
Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2507 (1993). 
 33. See, e.g., Tsen Lee, supra note 31. 
 34. Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague 
v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203 
(1998). 
 35. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 
(1996). 
 36. One such concern is the lack of a direct inter-institutional check on the Court’s intra-
institutional efforts. See infra Parts I and IV; Lawson, supra note 11, at 195 (noting that there is very 
little Congress can do “even if the courts’ own methods for deciding cases . . . are unconstitutionally 
wrong”). 
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changed—interpretations of substantive law. Decisions within this small 
subset affirmatively force courts to decide cases in unconstitutional 
ways—by ignoring things that should not be ignored, considering things 
that should not be considered, and asking questions that should not be 
asked.  
Part II locates the idea of unconstitutional courses in historical context. 
To this end, part II briefly reviews Swift v. Tyson, exploring both the 
theoretical and the functional problems with Swift’s decisionmaking 
methodology. Part II then draws the analysis back to the broader 
unconstitutional course thesis, briefly noting the ways in which Swift is 
(and is not) a troubling decisional model.  
Part III discusses a second unconstitutional course, one that governs a 
significant portion of contemporary habeas corpus law. As a part of this 
analysis, part III offers an opinionated review of Williams v. Taylor, the 
Court’s recent interpretation of AEDPA’s “state review” provision. Part 
III then explains how this interpretation requires courts to make decisions 
in impermissible ways—and how it forges a kind of constitutional 
purgatory, a doctrinal nether-region in which federal courts are required to 
ratify constitutional error.37  
Part IV examines the more troubling aspects of unconstitutional 
courses, especially those of a modern stripe. Some of these 
unconstitutional courses, part IV explains, run impermissible means to 
impermissible ends; they force, that is, federal courts to reach 
unconstitutional outcomes.38 As this happens, unconstitutional courses 
stray into precarious theoretical and doctrinal territory.39 Part IV surveys 
this territory, asking (and briefly answering) a number of pressing “course-
related” questions: Are there inter-institutional checks on Court-made 
unconstitutional courses? If not, how far may these courses go? May the 
Court redefine full categories of substantive protections simply by crafting 
“deferential” procedural models?  
Part V closes this Article, noting that Congress’s almost habitual 
jurisdiction-stripping efforts may continue to fall short—but that, in their 
 
 
 37. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). 
 38. See Gunther, supra note 7, at 910. 
[V]irtually all the commentators agree that, even if Congress can withdraw jurisdiction from 
the federal courts in a whole class of cases, it cannot allow a federal court jurisdiction but 
dictate the outcomes of cases, or require a court to decide cases in disregard of the 
Constitution. That is a significant limitation. 
Id. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 886; Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, 
and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 954 (1998). 
 39. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/1
p1679 Bloom book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES 1687 
 
 
 
 
noisy failure, they may obscure another potent threat to the “judicial 
Power.” 
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES 
Imagine that the Supreme Court required all civil rights claims to be 
decided by flipping a coin.40 Or that all antitrust issues were to be resolved 
by consulting a “Delphic oracle.”41 Or even that all copyright questions 
were to be answered by “studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”42  
Something about these instructions seems—even feels—wrong, if still 
curiously close to reality.43 But what about these instructions is so 
unacceptable? Nothing about the coin or the oracle or the entrails ensures 
that a court will reach the wrong result in any particular case, so what 
prohibits the Court from making such demands?  
The answer,44 of course, has to do with process—and the deep 
procedural flaws in these coin-flipping, oracle-consulting, and entrails-
studying models.45 “Procedure” has never been easy to define.46 In some 
contexts, “procedure” is merely a collection of “decision rules,” a set of 
baseline standards that shape the mechanics of adjudication;47 in others, it 
is an alternative to (or bar against) consideration of the merits of a case;48 
 
 
 40. See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring) (“I would call the case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge 
would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Chicago, 215 F. Supp. 2d 975, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“What is 
thus called for at this point is a divination of entrails, without even the benefit of an opaque 
pronouncement from any Delphic oracle.”). 
 42. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Entrails of various types occupy a 
surprisingly prominent spot in federal doctrine. See, e.g., Artway v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 
1272 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Any efforts of the lower courts in the federal system to interpret the sometimes 
Delphic pronouncements from the Supreme Court can on occasion resemble (to mix metaphors) the 
divination of entrails.”); Salem Nat. Bank v. Smith, 890 F.2d 22, 24 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Appellate 
opinions are not like the entrails of sheep, to be read for omens.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Reyes v. Seifert, 125 F. App’x 788, 789 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no remediable 
injury where a juror “based his decision to vote guilty on the result of a coin flip”). 
 44. Perhaps this answer is only the most obvious of many, but it is the one that matters here. 
 45. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory 
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 472 (1986). 
 46. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 193 (2004). 
 47. Id. at 201 (citing Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984)). Perhaps the most famous heuristic for 
dividing procedural from substantive is Justice Harlan’s “primary”-or-“secondary” test in Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). This test has proven quite durable, see 
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523–24 (2004), but it is not without its critics. See Ely, supra 
note 16, at 699–700. 
 48. Retroactivity, adequate and independent state grounds, and procedural default all raise 
questions here, especially in the habeas context. In each, “procedure” seems to take a rather 
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in still others, it is whatever “substantive law” is not.49 All of these 
definitions prove somehow accurate, if only partially so.50  
And all of these definitions imply something unremarkable: Procedure 
matters. It matters enough, in fact, that some procedural errors face real (if 
imperfect51) doctrinal restraints.52  
But not all types of procedure confront similar limits, even when they 
touch the heart of the adjudicative system. There is no robust restraint, for 
example, on the specific decisionmaking steps that courts take or the 
analytical procedures that courts follow. When federal courts make 
decisions in subtly53 unconstitutional ways, in fact, there may be nothing 
to stop them.  
But why is this so? Do the courts’ decisionmaking procedures simply 
not matter? Do they matter only in extreme cases? Or might these 
decisionmaking procedures present real (constitutional) problems—even 
in cases not involving coins, oracles, or entrails?  
To begin answering these questions, this section develops the idea of 
“unconstitutional courses.” Subsection A offers an initial explanation of 
what these “courses” are and why these courses are so often overlooked; it 
also puts forward an (intentionally implausible) example of an 
impermissible decisionmaking procedure, attempting to draw the broader 
“unconstitutional course” idea into greater focus. Subsection B then 
describes what “unconstitutional courses” are not, carefully distinguishing 
these courses from other types of Court-made unconstitutionality.  
 
 
idiosyncratic form. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 
YALE L.J. 947, 996 (2001) (“Of course, what is procedure for purposes of retroactivity differs from 
what is procedure for purposes of what law emanating from another jurisdiction a forum state must 
enforce.” (citing Walter W. Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE 
L.J. 333, 341–43 (1933))). 
 49. Some follow a kind of intuitionist’s approach to the procedure-substance divide, believing 
that they will know procedure when they see it. But cf. Solum, supra note 46, at 194–95 (debunking 
this notion). But no matter what definitional framework one uses, the lines are quite “hazy.” Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). Even Professor Ely’s famous 
taxonomy draws rather fine distinctions. See Ely, supra note 16, at 724–25 (Procedural rules are 
“designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes”; substantive law is law governing a right granted for some purpose not related to “the 
fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.”) (citations omitted). 
 50. See Solum, supra note 46, at 183. 
 51. See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: “Fairness” v. Process, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 313, 320 (1999). 
 52. Errors in the appellate process, see, for example, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956); 
errors in trial argument, see, for example, New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 312–13 
(1929), and errors involving the jury, see for example, Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); 
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), all fit this mold. 
 53. Coin-flipping, oracle-consulting, and entrails-studying are anything but subtle. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/1
p1679 Bloom book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES 1689 
 
 
 
 
A. What They Are 
So why do the courts’ decisionmaking procedures attract so little 
attention? If it is truly “silly to say that the core of the judicial power is 
merely the power to reach a result,” why is it so easy to ignore the 
analytical “process by which that result is reached”?54  
Part of reason is the shrouded character of judicial decisionmaking—
what Justice Cardozo called the mysterious “brew[ing]” of a “strange 
compound . . . in the caldron of the courts.”55 Since even judges labor to 
describe the “process[es] . . . followed” in deciding cases, it is no surprise 
that those processes often avoid sustained critical attention.  
Another part of reason is a nearly compulsive focus on outcomes—a 
(powerfully consequentialist56) sense that it is ends that matter, not 
means.57  
And another, more substantial part of the reason that courts’ 
decisionmaking procedures attract scant attention is the unlikely source 
 
 
 54. Lawson, supra note 11, at 211. 
 55. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9 (1931) (“Any judge, one 
might suppose, would find it easy to describe the [decisionmaking] process which he had followed 
. . . . Nothing could be farther from the truth.”). There are, Justice Cardozo suggests, a number of 
ingredients added to the decisional “brew”: 
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information do I appeal for 
guidance? In what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the result? In what 
proportions ought they to contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow 
it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that will make precedent for the 
future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall 
I seek it? At what point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some 
consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the common standards of justice and 
morals? 
Id. at 10. See also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 53–54 
(1960); Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 U. ILL. L. REV. 645, 653–55 (1932); Joseph C. 
Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decisions, 14 
CORNELL L.Q. 274, 281–82, 285 (1929). For an illuminating discussion of these seminal works, see 
Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 650–51, 675 (1998). 
 56. Or utilitarian.  See Solum, supra note 46, at 185. 
 57. The goal of the adjudicative system is, after all, reliable outcomes. Callins v. Collins, 510 
U.S. 1141, 1144–45 (1994) (“Courts are in the very business of erecting procedural devices from 
which fair, equitable, and reliable outcomes are presumed to flow.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Warren Burger, Lawrence Cooke: A Tireless Judicial Administrator, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 147, 147 
(1984) (“[T]he courts and their procedures, like the legal profession and the laws, are not ends in 
themselves but a means to an end—a tool—and the end is the proper administration of justice.”). But 
there is still a rather sinister chapter in the consequentialist’s story, one in which core procedural rights 
transform into fungible things, systemic “costs” easy enough to bargain away. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., 
The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 87–88 (1999) (exploring the “gaps” 
that develop between rights and remedies); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights / Remedies 
Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1 (2002); Sager, supra note 23, at 1224 (discussing discrepancies in “the scope 
of the norms of the Constitution and the scope of their judicial enforcement”). 
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from which the most sinister procedures sometimes emerge: the Supreme 
Court itself. On occasion, the Court will build unconstitutional 
decisionmaking frameworks, systems that require inferior federal courts—
and, ultimately, the Court itself—to make decisions in unconstitutional 
ways. Most (if not all) of these Court-prescribed decisionmaking methods 
appear superficially innocuous and outcome-neutral:58 No entrails are 
involved; no particular outcome is foreordained.  
But the core constitutional problem with these decisional structures is 
not one of plainly absurd decisional techniques; nor is it one of 
(predetermined) ends. The central problem is one of discreet analytical 
means—of facts improperly ignored, of law impermissibly considered, of 
questions misguidedly asked. The central problem, in short, is the 
“unconstitutional course”59 that the Court charts.  
This is surely a bit too abstract.60 To bring this “unconstitutional 
course” idea into greater focus, it may help to consider an example, one 
with a touch of exaggeration. So imagine (again) that the Supreme Court 
has required all civil rights claims to be decided by flipping a coin.61 
Imagine, too, that Plaintiff P has filed a civil rights claim in federal court.  
As it happens, Plaintiff P’s claim is a strong one, and it possesses more 
than ample factual and legal support.62 Under the Court’s coin-flipping 
model, however, the strength of Plaintiff P’s claim does not matter. All 
that matters is what the coin says.  
Of course, nothing about the Court’s coin-flipping model guarantees an 
incorrect substantive result. The coin may provide the “correct” 
substantive answer in Plaintiff P’s case; it may not.  
But whatever outcome the coin generates, the court will have reached 
its conclusion in an impermissible way—through an untenable 
decisionmaking “course.” As a part of this impermissible coin-flipping 
course, the court will have systematically disregarded important 
information (e.g., the specific facts and merits of Plaintiff P’s particular 
claim). As a part of this coin-flipping course, the court will have ignored 
 
 
 58. Cf. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977). 
 59. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). Compare what 
Professor Lawson has deemed, in a separate context, “unconstitutionally wrongheaded[] method[s] of 
decision-making.” Lawson, supra note 11, at 211.  
 60. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 269 
(1975).  
 61. See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring).  
 62. Plaintiff P’s claim, for example, runs into no qualified immunity bars. See generally Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
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relevant sources of law while considering prohibited ones (e.g., the coin).63 
And as a part of this course, the court will have asked the wrong legal and 
factual questions (e.g., heads or tails?).  
Things are rarely so blatant. Few of the Court’s procedural 
“wol[ves]”64 take such obvious and ominous form. But the absurdity of 
this coin-flipping example should not obscure its essential (if banal) 
lesson: How courts make decisions can be quite important. At times, in 
fact, how courts make decisions can be unconstitutional. 
B. What They Aren’t 
But this paints only half of the necessary picture. It is surely important 
to specify what an unconstitutional course is. But it is just as important to 
specify what an unconstitutional course is not, if only to show that 
unconstitutional courses will not (conveniently) appear wherever one 
might hope to find them.  
So what isn’t an “unconstitutional course”?  
An unconstitutional course is not simply a disagreeable decision of 
substantive law. In the process of interpreting the Sixth Amendment, for 
example, the Court may reach a debatable, subjectively problematic, or 
even subsequently-changed interpretation of the confrontation clause.65 
Academics and other federal judges (including other members of the 
Supreme Court) may disagree with the Court’s final, controlling 
interpretation. These critics may even think that the Court’s decision is 
“unconstitutional” inasmuch as it conflicts with their own measures of the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment.66  
But this type of substantive (interpretative) disagreement matters very 
little, at least in a narrow sense. When the Supreme Court says that the 
confrontation clause means X, X is what the confrontation clause means—
officially, if not epistemologically.67 X is, to echo a familiar maxim, “the 
 
 
 63. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).  
 64. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]his wolf comes 
as a wolf.”).  
 65. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980)). Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers v. Hardwick[, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986),] should be and now is overruled.”); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (“Any 
language in Plessy v. Ferguson[, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),] contrary to this finding is rejected.”). 
 66. Or, perhaps, the judges’ own “good conscience.” See Rico v. Terhune, 63 F. App’x 394 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., dissenting in part).  
 67. This oversimplifies the debate fairly significantly, but the relevant point remains: When a 
majority of Supreme Court Justice interprets a particular provision of substantive law to mean X, that 
is what the provision means.  
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law of the land.”68 An inferior federal court may not disregard the X-
interpretation when applying the confrontation clause, even if the lower 
court thinks the clause should mean Y.69  
Were the Supreme Court to reinterpret all of the Bill of Rights in a 
particularly insidious way, in fact, no “unconstitutional course” would 
necessarily emerge—not because the Supreme Court’s authority to declare 
what the law “is” makes the institution intellectually infallible, but because 
that authority makes it substantively “right.”70  
When the Court does chart an unconstitutional course, the primary 
concern is not substantive law—whether the Sixth Amendment,71 the 
Rules of Decision Act,72 or otherwise. The central problem is how federal 
courts may (or must) go about making decisions: how the federal courts 
must systematically disregard important information;73 how the courts 
must consider prohibited sources of law;74 how the courts must contravene 
established definitions of substantive law; and how the courts must reach 
outcomes in a manner inconsistent with—and antithetical to—the 
Constitution itself.  
In some contexts, this is more than problem enough. Since how a court 
answers a question can be as important as what it decides—Justice 
Cardozo’s skepticism notwithstanding75—a flawed decisionmaking 
method raises serious analytical and constitutional concerns.76 These 
 
 
 68. See CHOPER, supra note 6, at 6.  
 69. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional 
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570–71 n.1 (2001) (citing, for example, Larry Alexander, 
Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 571, 575 (1987)); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1978) 
(discussing the idea of “precedent”). Adherence to the “powerful” doctrine of stare decisis on matters 
of substantive law, however unpleasant, is simply the role of inferior federal courts—as well as the 
basis of a properly functioning judiciary. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Which is not to say that a principled 
theory of precedent exists. All we have—as Judge Easterbrook explains—is a “grand balancing test, 
[one] with no maximand nor weights to produce a decision where criteria are in conflict.” Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 422 (1988); cf. 
CHOPER, supra note 6, at 148–55, and accompanying notes (discussing “[t]he substantial number of 
instances in which lower courts (state as well as federal) and law enforcement officials have sought to 
subvert [] [] Court[] decisions”).  
 70. As Justice Jackson rather famously noted, the Court is “not final because [it is] infallible”; 
the Court is “infallible only because [it is] final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).  
 73. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (Pet. 16) 1 (1842).  
 74. The “brooding omnipresence in the sky” is likely the most recognizable—if now vilified—of 
these sources. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 75. See CARDOZO, supra note 55, at 9; LLEWELLYN, supra note 55, at 53–54.  
 76. These concerns are discussed at length, infra Parts II, III, and IV.  
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concerns are evident, even obvious when the decisionmaking method 
involves flipping coins or studying entrails.  
But these concerns are no less important, no less pressing when the 
decisionmaking method takes less conspicuous form. In Swift v. Tyson, the 
Court propounded just this type of flawed-but-inconspicuous 
decisionmaking system. It has done so again in Williams v. Taylor. The 
sections that follow examine and compare these unconstitutional courses. 
Neither Swift’s nor Williams’ course is as manifestly peculiar as the 
flipping of coins or the studying of entrails.77 But each course proves that 
the courts’ specific decisionmaking structures merit serious inquiry—not 
simply as a nod to “procedure for procedure’s sake,”78 but as a critical 
record of the rise and fall of the “judicial Power.”79 
II. HISTORY’S MODEL: SWIFT’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE 
Nearly every law student remembers something about Swift v. Tyson.80 
The question of New York banking law, the strained interpretation of the 
Rules of Decision Act,81 the “breaching [of] the line between prescriptive 
and interpretive power”82—all of these things sound at least faintly 
familiar, if only as a prelude to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.83 To many of 
these students, Swift recalls a particular type of “bad”84 law, one of those 
few cases eventually deemed so “intolerabl[e]” that the Supreme Court 
eventually reversed itself.85  
But why is Swift burdened with this doctrinal scarlet letter?86 If Swift 
really “marked [no] sudden and dramatic change from prior practice,”87 
 
 
 77. In one, however, there are oracles of a sort. See infra Part II.  
 78. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 45, at 472. 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 80. 41 U.S. (Pet. 16) 1 (1842). See also TONY ALLAN FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE 
SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM chs. II–III (1981). 
 81. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (1982)); cf. William Fletcher, The 
General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984) (arguing that Swift’s decision was hardly as anomalous as generally 
believed). 
 82. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1694 (2004). 
 83. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 84. Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 424. 
 85. Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 639 (1989). 
 86. See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (1850). 
 87. See Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1513, 1515 (“[L]ong before Swift, federal courts employed the 
general common law as an important part of their working jurisprudence.”). 
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why is it so easy, to borrow Judge Easterbrook’s phrase, to “see the virtue 
of abandoning” it?88  
This section attempts to answer these questions. To that end, subsection 
A reviews some of the familiar critiques (both theoretical and functional) 
of Swift. Subsection B then addresses Swift’s oft-ignored but 
constitutionally problematic decisionmaking methodology. And 
subsection C locates Swift’s decisionmaking method within the broader 
unconstitutional course thesis, briefly noting the ways in which Swift is 
(and is not) a troubling decisional model.  
A. Swift in Context 
So why is it so easy to “see the virtue of abandoning” Swift, especially 
in hindsight? Part of the reason is novelty. Rarely does the Court declare 
one of its own decisions philosophically invalid.89 When the Court does 
so—as Erie did to Swift—it typically causes quite a stir,90 as well as a kind 
of retrospective vilification.91  
Another part of the reason is jurisprudential theory. To many, Swift 
represents the apotheosis of an utterly misguided conception of law, a 
sophism of legal thought.92 To these detractors, Swift’s very name evokes 
the long-discredited notion that the common law is a “self-sustaining body 
of normative authority, living through the articulations of the federal 
judiciary alone.”93 
 88. Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 424. 
 89. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers v. Hardwick[, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986),] should be and now is overruled.”); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (“Any 
language in Plessy v. Ferguson[, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),] contrary to this finding is rejected.”). In 
Lawrence, the Court makes explicit that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not 
correct today.” 539 U.S. at 578. The Erie Court makes no comparable statement about Swift, but a 
similar point seems implicit in the Court’s wholesale denunciation of Justice Story’s opinion. 
 90. “The decision went unnoticed until Justice Stone wrote privately to Arthur Krock of the New 
York Times calling to his attention ‘the most important opinion since I have been on the court.’” 
STEVEN YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 224 (6th ed. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 91. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 424; see also FREYER, supra note 80, at chs. I–II and 
2; Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 
(1964); see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: 
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (2000). 
 92. See, e.g., Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 
529, 545–46 (1951) (“The danger to be feared in this effort to revive the concept of natural law is that 
it will lead us unconsciously back to the shop-worn absolutes of an earlier day.”). Many others 
disagree with this uncharitable conception of natural law. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHT (1980); DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 126, 149. 
 93. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
395, 428 (1994) (citation omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/1
p1679 Bloom book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES 1695 
 
 
 
 
And part of the reason that Swift bears such a sullied mark is its long-
lasting—and troubling—effect on federal court decisionmaking. In the last 
century, much has been written about Swift’s philosophical deficits.94 In 
slightly more recent times, a great deal has been written about the 
paradigm-altering way Erie rejected Swift’s jurisprudential logic.95 Lost in 
these important discussions, however, is a thoroughgoing examination of 
something more mechanical, more concrete: the problematic 
decisionmaking model that Swift erected and endorsed. This 
decisionmaking model was—as Justice Brandeis unequivocally concludes 
in Erie—itself unconstitutional.96 This decisionmaking model is also the 
archetypal unconstitutional course.97  
It is an archetype born in an unglamorous—even unremarkable98—
setting. In a very narrow sense, Swift asked a pedestrian question about 
New York banking law: How many defenses did a “bill of exchange” 
carry?99 In a slightly broader (more formal) sense, Swift presented a 
straightforward problem of lexicology: What does the word “laws” in the 
Rules of Decision Act (RODA)100 mean? Does the word “laws” denote 
“rules and enactments promulgated by [state] legislature authority” and 
“decisions of local tribunals”—that is, “common as well as statutory 
law”—or does it signify statutory law alone?101  
In an even broader (more jurisprudential) sense, of course, Swift 
involved more than semantics. Folded into Swift’s formal definitional 
exercise is a weighty philosophical question about the source and meaning 
of law generally: Does “positive,” “obligatory” law exist exclusive of a 
sovereign source—i.e., is law made or found?102  
 
 
 94. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 424; Charles Warren, New Light on the History of 
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923); Alton B. Parker, 
The Common Law Jurisdiction of the United States Courts, 17 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1907). 
 95. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 
VA. L. REV. 673 (1998). 
 96. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938). 
 97. Id. at 78; id. at 91 (Reed, J., concurring). 
 98. See Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1513. 
 99. Id. at 1514 (“[Swift is] a decision on the law of negotiable instruments concerning the 
availability of defenses to a remote endorsee who had taken a bill of exchange in payment of 
preexisting debt.”). 
 100. Section 34 of the Rules of Decision Act provided that “[t]he laws of the several states, except 
where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall 
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States . . . .” Ch. 20, 
§ 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652). According to Judge Fletcher, section 34 
was an “afterthought” passed “without serious debate,” Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1527, perhaps even 
as a “temporary provision.” Id. at 1562. 
 101. Lessig, supra note 93, at 427. 
 102. Id. 
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To legal positivists103—whose day on the Court was yet to come—the 
answer to this philosophical question is plain: law is made, not found. 
There is no pre-existing body of law for courts to find; to quote Justice 
Holmes’s famous maxim, there is “no brooding omnipresence in the 
sky.”104 All there is, Holmes assures, is “the articulate voice of some 
sovereign,”105 whether legislative or judicial.  
But to advocates of natural law—who held sway on the Swift 
Court106—the answer is just as plain, though precisely the opposite: law 
can indeed be found. An ethereal corpus of law does exist, just waiting to 
be divined.107 And since state courts can claim no priority regarding the 
location and meaning of this “law”—no special faculty in divining this 
“omnipresence”—there is no reason to treat state court decisions as law 
binding on federal courts. Federal courts are, in the end, just as skilled at 
surveying this body of “natural” law—at playing the role, in Lord 
Blackstone’s aphoristic phrase, of “living oracles.”108 Federal courts may 
even be better “oracles,”109 so it makes sense that federal courts should 
find this law themselves.110  
Swift adopted this strongly naturalistic position.111 Lead by Justice 
Story, the Swift Court defined RODA’s “laws” to include legislative 
 103. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 233, 235 (J. Bowring 
ed. 1840); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED I & V (1st ed. 1832). For 
two extended (and divergent) discussions of positivism generally, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 85–100 (1961), and DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 17–22. 
 104. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. Justice Holmes’s imagery grew from solid meteorological stock. See, e.g., P. DU 
PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 88 (1824) (“Like the sun under a cloud, it was overshadowed . . . .”). See also 
Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1517 (calling Holmes’s brand of positivism both “time- and culture-bound,” 
a far cry from nineteenth century conceptions of “a general system of jurisprudence . . . constantly 
hovering over [] local legislation and filling up its interstices”) (citations omitted). 
 106. See, e.g., 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 471–78 (1884); GERALD DUNNE, 
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 406–08 (1970). 
 107. Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial 
Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1766 (2004) (noting that a “natural law” 
judge would not dictate particular outcomes in future cases, but “would simply articulate principles 
that a subsequent judge inevitably would find on his own in the course of deciding a subsequent 
case”). 
 108. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 69 (U. Chi. 1979); see also Dennis Nolan, Sir 
William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 731 (1976). 
 109. Lessig, supra note 93, at 427–30. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 17 (1842). Some keen observers have attempted to recast 
Swift as a subtly pro-positivistic decision. See, e.g., WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953). Clever as these attempts may seem, 
however, they are surely more post hoc contrarianism than accurate description. See William Casto, 
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proclamations—that is, “positive” statements from legislatures—and 
nothing more.112 To the Swift Court, state court decisions were mere 
“pronouncements” by judges, judicial conclusions reached through what 
Professor Lessig has called a process of “scientistic” adjudication—a 
relatively orderly investigation of some overarching, intangible body of 
“law.”113 Federal courts, Swift explained, need not accept these state-court 
“pronouncements” as binding authority, even when the law to be “found” 
involved a narrow question of state law. Indeed, since state courts possess 
no special talent in this empirical law-finding enterprise, federal courts 
may—perhaps must114—“find” “general federal common law” themselves. 
Swift’s extended denouement is well chronicled. In the near-century 
after the decision, Swift came to represent the triumph of a specific 
conception of common law, one in which state-court decisions were only 
“evidence” of the law, not law itself.115 During this time, federal courts 
developed “some twenty-eight areas of [federal] common law 
jurisprudence.”116  
As time passed, however, cracks in Swift’s foundation started to 
expand.117 Some of these cracks took practical (or structural) form. One 
such crack exposed a serious separation-of-powers defect, a kind of 
unsustainable judicial overreaching118 that permitted federal courts to 
“declare federal law [even] on questions over which Congress could not 
The Erie Doctrine And the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 918 (1988) 
(calling these efforts “anachronistic”). A tighter reconceptualization of Swift comes from Professor 
Horwitz, who has argued that Justice Story’s decision was something of a stalking horse—a less than 
“serious[]” manipulation of “orthodox legal theory” intended to advance commercialism. MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, 245–50 (1977). Perhaps a deep 
pro-entrepreneurial spirit did motivate Justice Story; perhaps Swift really was a nod to business in the 
guise of natural law. But Swift has always represented something different, viz., a pinnacle of 
naturalistic legal reasoning. 
 112. See Lessig, supra note 93, at 427 (exploring the roots of Justice Story’s decision to read 
“laws” narrowly). 
 113. Id. In this sense, Professor Lessig explains, Swift is a triumph of “Baconian empiricism,” a 
system in which “[s]cience became the premise for common law studies . . . . Law was, in this view, a 
science, where jurists, like scientists, were seeking truth, and where this search for juristic truth could 
be separated from political ends.” Lessig, supra note 93, at 428–30 (“We are likely to resist this 
description of jurists of the nineteenth century, in part because we misunderstand what they meant by 
‘science.’”). 
 114. Under Swift, federal courts may even be required “to express [their] own opinion[s] of the 
true result of the [] law upon the [presented] question[s].” 41 U.S. at 19. 
 115. Id. at 18–19. 
 116. Lessig, supra note 93, at 426. 
 117. Id. at 430. 
 118. Professor Strauss has called this an over-extended “privilege of federal courts.” Strauss, 
supra note 6, at 913. 
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legislate.”119 Another such crack revealed a deep federalism flaw, a kind of 
unsustainable federal overreaching that permitted a federal institution to 
exercise the power of state legislatures.120  
As these more practical cracks widened, Swift’s philosophical deficits 
began to emerge as well. With Swift’s conception of common law came an 
entirely contestable—and increasingly contested121—naturalistic 
jurisprudential philosophy, a belief in some “brooding omnipresence in the 
sky.”122 In the near-century following Swift, this philosophy drew ever-
increasing fire—not least from some members of the Court.123 
Erie struck the decisive (judicial) blow in this contest. In Erie, Swift’s 
supposed philosophical “fallacy” was exposed, its specious dependence on 
a “transcendental body of law outside any particular State but obligatory 
within it” undercut.124 To the Erie Court, Swift’s interpretation of the word 
“laws” was worse than wrong; it was itself unconstitutional—not “because 
the federal common law rules that had been developed under it were 
encroaching on areas of ‘state substantive law’ or ‘state law governing 
primary private activity,’”125 but because “nothing in the Constitution 
provided the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the 
sort” Swift condoned.126 As the Erie Court understood it, Swift’s very 
existence depended on a profound misconception of the way law is spoken 
and understood.127 Only by fundamentally “transform[ing]” this invalid 
discourse,128 Erie concluded, could the Court’s path be set aright.  
B. Swift’s Course 
For good reason, this exceptional shift in jurisprudential philosophy has 
attracted a great deal of academic attention. The triumph of a Holmesian 
type of legal positivism,129 the scaling back of the judiciary’s “prescriptive 
 119. Id. at 912–13; see also Wilkinson, supra note 82, at 1694. 
 120. See Lessig, supra note 93, at 431. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 123. See, e.g., id. 
 124. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (noting that this law could be “changed 
by statute”) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 125. See Ely, supra note 16, at 702–04 (“[I]t is on precisely those areas that new federal domestic 
legislation inevitably encroaches.”). 
 126. Id. at 703. 
 127. See Lessig, supra note 93, at 432 (“One discourse died, and another replaced it, and it is from 
this contestation in the discourse about law that Erie got its sanction.”) (citation omitted). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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power,”130 the power of Erie’s federalist theme,131 the pattern of doctrinal 
change that Erie represents132—all have prompted detailed review.  
But Erie did more than signal a shift in dominant legal philosophy, a 
repudiation of Swift’s conception of “law.” Erie denounced Swift’s method 
(or means) of judicial decisionmaking; it condemned, that is, the 
impermissible analytical procedure—the “unconstitutional course”—that 
Swift’s naturalism condoned.133 Put in more abstract terms, Erie rejected 
the why of Swift, and it rejected the what of Swift as well.134  
To give content to this why-and-what notion, it is helpful to consider 
how an inferior federal court would decide a case using Swift’s decisional 
model. In generic terms, Swift’s decisionmaking system proceeds in two 
steps: The federal court must first determine if any germane, Swift-
recognized “positive” law—that is, statutory law—guides resolution of the 
relevant question. If there is applicable statutory direction, the federal 
court must abide that law as “obligatory.”135 But if there is no applicable 
legislative pronouncement, the court may then find its own law, looking to 
a body of “transcendental” law for instruction—and consulting analogous 
state—court common law only as the federal court sees fit.  
A slight twist on Swift’s facts offers a specific illustration of this 
(unconstitutional) two-step decisionmaking process. In this fictional 
example, the question before the federal court is how many defenses a 
“bill of exchange” carries—this time under New Jersey law.136 Like New 
York (in 1841, at least), New Jersey lacks a statutory index of the relevant 
defenses, so, under Swift, there is no “obligatory,” “positive” law to direct 
the court’s analysis. As it happens, New Jersey’s courts have already 
answered this precise question, exhaustively cataloguing the defenses 
available. But this state-court common law is, under Swift, of little 
moment. Such decisions are “at most evidence of what the laws are”; they 
are “not themselves laws.”137 It falls to the federal court, then, to determine 
for itself how many defenses exist—i.e., to “find” the answer by 
 130. Wilkinson, supra note 82, at 1694. 
 131. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 913. 
 132. See Lessig, supra note 93, at 432–33. 
 133. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 91. 
 134. See Lawson, supra note 11, at 210 (“One cannot decide cases without bringing to bear some 
decision-making methodology . . . .”). 
 135. Swift, 41 U.S. at 17. 
 136. See id. The analogy is to Swift itself. 
 137. Id. at 18–19 (“Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are 
entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this court . . . .”). 
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consulting some “transcendental body of law outside any particular State 
but obligatory within it.”138  
In the end, the federal court may “find” ten defenses; it may find five. 
The court’s decision may comport with existing state common law; it may 
not. The outcome may appear objectively correct on the facts; it may not.  
What the particular outcome is, however, is not the essence of the 
constitutional problem. The source of the constitutional problem is how 
the federal court made its decision: how that decisionmaking process 
involved an untenable aggrandizement of federal power, how it depended 
on an untenable aggrandizement of judicial power, how it relied on an 
ephemeral “brooding omnipresence,” and how it overemphasized empiric 
and scientistic adjudication.139 These how problems do more than raise 
concerns of form and theory. They turn Swift’s decisionmaking process 
into an inherently unconstitutional enterprise, placing all Swift-abiding 
federal courts on an unconstitutional decisionmaking “course.”  
C. Swift’s Dangers 
It bears emphasis that nothing about Swift’s decisionmaking “course” 
guarantees federal courts will reach incorrect—let alone 
unconstitutional—substantive outcomes. In some contexts, Swift-following 
federal courts will “find” “correct” substantive results; in some contexts, 
these courts will even reach conclusions consistent with state common 
law, partially ameliorating Swift’s significant federalism tension.  
But even these “correct” and “consistent” decisions are constitutionally 
infirm because of the decisionmaking method used to achieve them. By 
attempting to “find” law, by consulting a “brooding omnipresence,” by 
overextending both federal and judicial power, the federal court follows 
an unconstitutional decisional course—no matter what outcome the court 
reaches.  
It likewise bears emphasis that this is a constitutional problem of the 
Court’s own creation. In the abstract, the idea of Court-created 
unconstitutionality may seem—and may actually be—unexceptional. 
Every so often, the Court will change its interpretation of the Constitution, 
sometimes in ways that puzzle even the most meticulous of “fidelity” 
 138. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 139. This adjudicative approach had plenty of other (sometimes more superficial) problems: It 
risked unnecessary inconsistency between state and federal courts within the same state, and it 
encouraged a rather cynical type of forum shopping.  See id. at 533. 
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theorists.140 These interpretive shifts occasionally require the Court to 
refute (or to undo entirely) existing precedent. As this happens, prior Court 
interpretations of the Constitution are reframed as themselves 
unconstitutional: Brown v. Board141 deemed Plessy v. Ferguson142 
constitutionally invalid; Lawrence v. Texas143 did the same to Bowers v. 
Hardwick.144  
In significant ways, Plessy, Bowers, and Swift are birds of an 
unconstitutional feather. Each signifies a particular type of Court-made 
unconstitutionality—a particular type of “intolerabl[y]” “bad” law.145 Each 
suffered reversal by subsequent Supreme Court doctrine.  
But Swift is not a perfect partner to Plessy and Bowers. Swift’s 
constitutional invalidity has a different resonance, a different scope than 
Plessy’s and Bowers’. Where Plessy and Bowers announce dubious (and 
later rejected) interpretations of substantive law, Swift erects an 
unconstitutional decisionmaking apparatus. Where Plessy and Bowers 
(mis)construe specific portions of the Constitution, Swift allows federal 
courts to develop an entirely new (and relatively unconstrained) body of 
common law. And where Plessy and Bowers put inferior federal courts in 
the typical (if sometimes uncomfortable) position of adhering to stare 
decisis, Swift puts inferior federal courts in the remarkable position of 
making decisions according to an impermissible procedural framework—
i.e., according to an unconstitutional course.  
Rare as these unconstitutional courses may be, Swift demonstrates that 
they do, on occasion, develop. For some of these courses, the remedy is 
obvious and (perhaps) inevitable, the damage wrought more theoretical 
than real.146 For other courses, however, the remedy is neither obvious nor 
easy, the damage neither abstract nor trivial. Swift’s unconstitutional 
course may well fit safely in the first category. Williams v. Taylor’s 
unconstitutional course seems to fit just as securely in the second.  
 140. See generally Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
 141. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 142. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 143. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 144. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 145. Meador, supra note 85, at 639. 
 146. Erie unraveled Swift’s “unconstitutional course.” But even if the Court had refused to self-
correct, Swift’s course could have been easily righted. Congress, for one, could have modified RODA. 
State legislatures, for another, could have made more “positive” law. This latter option, to be sure, 
elides many of Swift’s fundamental problems, but it did exist as a “fix” of sorts, however limited it 
might have been. 
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III. A MODERN TURN: WILLIAMS’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE 
In many ways, Williams is a modern-day Swift. Like Swift, Williams 
grows from deep historical roots.147 Like Swift, Williams raises serious 
pragmatic and philosophical questions—about vague constitutional 
provisions148 and cryptic statutory law,149 about recondite Court doctrine150 
and federal court power.151 And like Swift, Williams prescribes a specific 
decisionmaking procedure. 
But Swift and Williams are far from a matched set. They address very 
different substantive legal questions. They make largely irreconcilable 
contributions to the federalism debate.152 They invest federal courts with 
very different levels of decisional latitude. And they announce very 
different kinds of unconstitutional courses, Williams’ version proving far 
more pernicious than its predecessor.  
This section takes an extended look at Williams’ unconstitutional 
course. Subsection A begins with a brief review of modern habeas corpus 
law, focusing in particular on the broader jurisprudential questions 
informing much of the habeas debate. Subsection B then situates this long-
running debate within contemporary doctrine, examining the Court’s 
interpretation of the AEDPA—and the Act’s state-review provision in 
particular. In support of this discussion, subsection C highlights a few of 
the more salient flaws in Williams’ AEDPA analysis. Subsection D 
follows with a detailed consideration of a particularly subtle but 
particularly important flaw, viz., Williams’ prescription of an 
unconstitutional course.  
A. Williams’ Context: Habeas Corpus 
Federal habeas review of state court decisions is a peculiar project. At 
once foreign and familiar, habeas seems to have a bit of everything, 
 
 
 147. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2337 (1993) 
[hereinafter Yackle, Hagioscope]. 
 148. Compare Erie’s cryptic constitutionalism, 304 U.S. at 78, with the Suspension Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2. 
 149. See, e.g., Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2431. 
 150. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992); Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
 151. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 19, at 2481. 
 152. Swift inserted federal courts into an area of state law; Williams shields state-court errors of 
federal law. 
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“open[ing] a window on the workings of our national government.”153 For 
this reason, habeas has been the source of serious debates—or, to borrow 
Professor Yackle’s more vigorous metaphor, pitched “ideological” 
“battle[s]”154—for decades.155 Should habeas review upset typical rules of 
preclusion and deference? Is federal habeas review of state-court decisions 
irreconcilably inconsistent with federalism?156 Does federal habeas review 
depend on an epistemological myth, a fiction that excuses potentially 
“endless” strings of collateral litigation because some “possibility of 
mistake always exists”?157 The questions are myriad—and quite durable in 
the “long and distinguished” history of the “Great Writ.”158  
Over time, the responses to these questions have grown just as 
commonplace, if not altogether ossified.159 To its staunchest critics, federal 
habeas review of state court decisions is (and has always been) a blatant 
affront to state autonomy. Habeas review, the critics observe, makes a 
state institution unnecessarily subordinate to a federal one, superimposing 
an inferior federal court as a kind of state appellate tribunal.160 At most, 
these critics contend, federal habeas review should ensure that state courts 
abide baseline jurisdictional and process-based guarantees—what Justice 
Pitney once termed “established modes of procedure.”161 It should not 
 
 
 153. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2331. 
 154. Id.  
 155. See, e.g., Dallin Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States 1776–1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 
(1965); Dallin Oaks, Legal History in the High Court—Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966); 
Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 928–33. 
 156. Federal habeas corpus has always confronted a kind of paradox. On the one hand, habeas 
corpus exists to allow prisoners to challenge—i.e., to “appeal”—putatively incorrect decisions of law, 
often those made by state courts. Yackle, supra note 35, at 409 (citation omitted). On the other hand, 
habeas is an extraordinary judicial remedy, not an opportunity to “relitigate [all] state trials.” Id. at 
411. 
 157. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 441, 447 (1963). 
 158. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2337. 
 159. Id. at 2431 (noting that the debate is “charged by ideological differences that have changed 
very little over the years”). 
 160. Id. at 2333. 
 161. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915). Since 1867, this process-based limit has 
been difficult to defend. Like the Acts that followed it, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Act of Feb. 5, 
1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (amending Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46), imposes no process 
limit and announces no exception for particular types of state-court decisions. Yackle, Hagioscope, 
supra note 147, at 2338; see Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 690–91 (1982) (“[U]ntil Stone v. Powell, the habeas statute consistently had 
been interpreted to provide federal habeas review for all constitutional claims regardless of the extent 
of prior state court litigation.”). So, however valid this process, or jurisdiction-based limit might have 
been, it no longer holds much jurisprudential water. See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension 
Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 862, 881 (1994) (“[I]t is simply wrong to assert that the writ known to the framers of the 
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open the door to federal reconsideration of every manner of constitutional 
claim,162 for universal habeas review would only “bur[y]” the federal 
courts “in a flood” of (often meritless) habeas petitions.163 
Advocates of more vigorous habeas review have long struggled to 
rebut the critics’ claims—not least because the critics are, in some ways, 
quite right: federal habeas review of state-court decisions does imply a 
federal distrust of state power, often quite plainly.164 Federal habeas 
review does smack of appellate review, contradicting ordinary preclusion 
doctrine and basic full faith and credit ideas.165 And federal habeas review 
does raise epistemological questions about “correct” conclusions and 
“actual” right answers166—as well as practical concerns about meritorious 
substantive “needles” being lost in a “haystack” of “worthless” ones.167  
But advocates of more expansive habeas review do have a powerful 
argument to make, one with solid theoretical and historical roots.168 To 
these habeas advocates, federal habeas review does more than ensure that 
the state court’s jurisdiction was valid—that it “act[ed]” properly “as a 
court.”169 Habeas allows federal courts to rectify state-court errors of 
federal constitutional law (process-based or not)170 and to vindicate federal 
rights171—not as enforcers of some type of thinly veiled anti-federalism, 
but as guardians of a healthy federalist balance, as shepherds of 
recalcitrant states, and as holders of “the final say” (in Justice 
 
 
Fourteenth Amendment was the same narrowly circumscribed writ known at English common law, or 
perhaps even known to the framers of the Suspension Clause.”); id. at 888 (noting that the 
“transformation” of the writ between 1789 and 1868 “strongly supports the writ’s role in protection 
national rights in a national forum”); see also Woolhandler, supra note 30, at 630. 
 162. Cole, supra note 19, at 2489. 
 163. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also 
Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 940 (calling “federal habeas for state prisoners . . . an exercise in judge-
shopping”). 
 164. See, e.g., Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2339 (discussing the “friction” caused by 
“plenary federal jurisdiction”). 
 165. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); see also Yackle, supra note 35, at 401; Tsen Lee, 
supra note 31, at 106–07. 
 166. Bator, supra note 157, at 446–47. 
 167. Brown, 344 U.S. at 537 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 168. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 161, at 881, 888. 
 169. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2340, 2346 (deeming a narrow understanding of due 
process “primitive”). 
 170. Id. at 2345–46 (noting that, to Professor Bator, direct review and collateral review were not 
identical, for Professor Bator treated “due process” as “one thing on direct review of a state court 
judgment and another in habeas corpus”) (citation omitted). 
 171. See Steiker, supra note 161, at 881, 888. 
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Frankfurter’s words) on questions of federal law172—even at the price of a 
“haystack” of empty claims.173  
For part of the last half-century, the Supreme Court subscribed to this 
catholic conception of habeas’ role. In Brown v. Allen,174 the Court set an 
unmistakable path of expanding and intensifying federal habeas review.175 
The Warren Court readily followed Brown’s lead, assuring that federal 
courts had a central role to play in the adjudication of federal 
constitutional questions—including those questions already decided by 
state courts.176 In three post-Brown cases—a group pithily labeled “[t]he 
great trilogy of habeas corpus decisions”177—the Warren Court specified 
how federal district courts should conduct their habeas work,178 how these 
courts should manage multiple petitions from a single petitioner,179 and 
how petitioners should navigate habeas’ often recondite procedural 
maze.180 All four of these decisions envisioned a broad and powerful writ 
of habeas, an almost “omnipotent writ of error.”181  
And all four prompted a healthy measure of criticism. Some of this 
criticism came from the academy.182 Some came, in time, from the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts.183 And some came from more overtly political 
sources, committees intent on revamping federal habeas law.184 A few of 
these political efforts garnered considerable support, but nearly all failed 
 
 
 172. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 774. 
 173. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Yackle, 
Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2342. 
 174. 344 U.S. at 443. 
 175. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2349 (arguing that the Warren Court treated the writ 
of habeas corpus as the “procedural analogue of its substantive interpretations of the Constitution—
providing federal machinery for bringing new constitutional values to bear in concrete cases.”). 
 176. Id. at 2343; see also Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for 
“Reasonably Erroneous” Applications of Federal Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 740–41 (2002). 
 177. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2347. 
 178. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
 179. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). 
 180. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
 181. Roger Berkowitz, Error-Centricity, Habeas Corpus, and the Rule of Law as the Law of 
Rulings, L.A. L. REV. 477, 482 (2004). See also Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). 
 182. Professor Bator, for example, called for a return of a narrow process limit and a rejection of 
habeas-created redundancy. Bator, supra note 157, at 446. 
 183. This criticism came primarily in the form of gradual retreats from thoroughgoing habeas 
review. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 181, at 1045. 
 184. As Kent Scheidegger has noted, Congress has come “tantalizingly close to abrogating the 
Brown rule” many times. Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 890. The Powell Commission was perhaps the 
most prominent of these committees. For a full text of the Powell Commission’s report, see 45 THE 
CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER 3239 (1989). 
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to produce much (if any) change in the way federal courts reviewed habeas 
petitions from state prisoners.185  
Until 1996, that is. In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act.186 An elaborate187 and expansive effort, 
AEDPA alters much of the preexisting habeas paradigm: One AEDPA 
section establishes new exhaustion rules; another erects more rigorous 
standards for successive petitions; one section sets a less-generous statute 
of limitations; still another truncates the review process in certain capital 
cases.188  
And one AEDPA provision addresses how federal courts review the 
merits of state court decisions. This state-court-review provision—
AEDPA’s section 2254(d)—has proven one of the Act’s most prominent 
features. It has also presented AEDPA’s deepest “interpretational 
problem[].”189 Section 2254(d) reads:  
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 
 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding.190 
At first blush, section 2254(d) appears to do very little work.191 It 
seems merely to posit a set of standards of review, defining the manner in 
which federal courts assess the merits of particular state court decisions.192 
It does not, on its face, seem to undercut the power of federal courts to 
review the substance of state court decisions of federal law;193 nor does it 
 
 
 185. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2349–73. 
 186. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 
(Supp. II 1996)). 
 187. See Yackle, supra note 35, at 381 (“The result . . . is extraordinarily arcane verbiage . . . .”). 
 188. Id.; see also Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 104 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, & 2261–66). 
 189. Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 104. 
 190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000). 
 191. For those that watch habeas law closely, of course, the very numbering of section 2254(d) 
draws attention. See Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 107. 
 192. Id. 
 193. This is no small thing. Whether courts may review is itself an important question—and not 
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seem to undo habeas’ noteworthy—if formally dubious—exemptions from 
ordinary preclusion doctrine and the full faith and credit statute.194  
But section 2254(d) does seem to hint at something significant—as 
habeas scholars and inferior federal courts noted almost immediately.195 
Between 1996 and 2000, these observers labored to find section 2254(d)’s 
core. If section 2254(d) establishes a more deferential standard of review, 
both for questions of law and for mixed questions of law and fact;196 how 
much (if at all) section 2254(d) raises the bar against granting habeas 
remedies;197 whether section 2254(d) conflicts with Article III’s central 
judicial vision198—courts and scholars engaged each of these questions, 
often quite comprehensively.199  
Not until 2000, however, did the Supreme Court take a clear (if 
fractured) position on the meaning and effect of section 2254(d). It took 
that position in Williams v. Taylor.200  
B. Williams and the Court 
Like so many habeas cases, Williams tells a cheerless and protracted 
story. The story’s legal chapter begins in 1986, when a Virginia state jury 
convicted Terry Williams of robbery and capital murder.201 At the 
sentencing hearing that followed, the prosecution introduced evidence of a 
litany of Mr. Williams’ prior offenses.202 In response, Mr. Williams’ 
counsel offered only a modicum of evidence, devoting most of his energy 
to “explaining that it was difficult to find a reason why the jury should 
spare Williams’ life.”203 The jury found no such reason; instead, it found 
 
 
one with easy answers in every case. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001) (though it is not impacted by the text of section 2254(d)). 
 194. Yackle, supra note 35, at 401–02. 
 195. See, e.g., id.; Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 890 (noting that AEDPA “touched off a mad 
scramble”); Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 357–62 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1004 
(1999). 
 196. See, e.g., Perez v. Marshall, 946 F. Supp. 1521, 1533 (S.D. Cal. 1996). 
 197. See, e.g., Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 891 (“Congress has plenary authority to determine 
the degree to which a state court’s judgment will preclude relitigation of the question . . . including [in] 
habeas corpus. Congress could prescribe total preclusion, de novo relitigation, or a middle ground.”). 
 198. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 864–84. 
 199. Id. 
 200. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 201. Id. at 368. 
 202. Id. at 368–69 (noting that many of these prior offenses were violent). 
 203. Id. at 369 (“The evidence offered by Williams’ trial counsel at the sentencing hearing 
consisted of the testimony of Williams’ mother, two neighbors, and a taped excerpt from a statement 
by a psychiatrist.”). In his opinion in Williams, Justice Stevens quotes defense counsel at length: 
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“a probability of future dangerousness” and “unanimously fixed Williams’ 
punishment at death.”204 The trial court deemed the sentence “proper” and 
“just.”205 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed—both on direct review 
and on review of a petition for state collateral relief.206 
In 1997, Mr. Williams filed a petition for federal habeas relief under 
section 2254.207 In his petition, Mr. Williams asserted, as he had in the 
state courts, that he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel. 
The federal district court agreed, and it granted Mr. Williams’ petition 
accordingly.208 The Fourth Circuit reversed,209 but the Supreme Court 
reinstated the district court’s conclusion,210 awarding Mr. Williams a rare 
victory on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.211  
But Mr. Williams’ victory was also a Pyrrhic one, at least for future 
habeas petitioners.  
In Williams, the Court elaborates an entirely “new constraint,”212 a new 
(and severe) limit on federal habeas courts’ “ability to review state court 
applications of law to fact.”213 This new limit derives, Williams contends, 
from section 2254(d) itself—the section’s “contrary to” and “unreasonable 
application” clauses in particular.214 These two clauses, Williams explains, 
have distinct meaning: To fit the “contrary to” standard, a state court 
decision must either follow the wrong rule or misread the facts 
blatantly.215 To satisfy the “unreasonable application” standard, by 
 
 
I will admit too that it is very difficult to ask you to show mercy to a man who maybe has not 
shown much mercy himself. I doubt very seriously that he thought much about mercy when 
he was in Mr. Stone’s bedroom that night with him. I doubt very seriously that he had mercy 
very highly on his mind when he was walking along West Green and the incident with 
Alberta Stroud. I doubt very seriously that he had mercy on his mind when he took two cars 
that didn’t belong to him. Admittedly it is very difficult to get us and ask that you give this 
man mercy when he has shown so little of it himself. But I would ask that you would. 
Id. at n.2. 
 204. Id. at 370. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Williams, 529 U.S. at 370. 
 207. This timing is significant. Since Mr. Williams filed his petition in 1997, his case is governed 
by AEDPA, not by “the pre-1996 version of the federal habeas statute.” Id. at 364. 
 208. Id. at 372–74. 
 209. Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 210. 529 U.S. at 374. 
 211. Id. In the sixteen years after Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court found 
no instance of inadequate representation. Cf. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: 
Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995). 
 212. Williams, 529 U.S. 411–13 (O’Connor, J.); cf. id. at 386 (arguing that section 2254(d) merely 
evinced a “‘mood’ that the Federal Judiciary must respect”) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 213. Pettys, supra note 176, at 749. 
 214. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404. 
 215. The state court, that is, must apply “a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the 
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contrast, a state court decision need not follow the wrong governing 
rule;216 the state court need only apply that rule “unreasonably to the 
facts.”217  
What “unreasonable” means, of course, is far from clear—as the 
Williams Court readily acknowledges.218 But what is clear, the Court 
assures, is what “unreasonable” does not mean: “[A]n unreasonable 
application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of 
federal law.”219 Had Congress meant “erroneous” or “incorrect,” Williams 
concludes, Congress would have said so. But Congress made a careful 
lexical decision not to say “erroneous” or “incorrect”—and to say 
“unreasonable” instead. With this semantic choice, the Court suggests, 
Congress instructed federal courts not to issue “the writ simply because [a] 
court concludes . . . that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.”220 Wrong is not 
enough. To issue the writ under section 2254(d)’s “unreasonable 
application” clause, a state court decision must be wrong and 
unreasonable; i.e., it must be unreasonably wrong.221 
C. A Selection of Knots 
There is something enticing about Williams’ “unreasonably wrong” 
standard.222 Judged by even the most forgiving measure,223 habeas doctrine 
 
 
Court’s] cases,” or it must “arrive[] at a result different from [Court] precedent” on a “set of facts that 
are materially indistinguishable from a decision” of the Court. Id. at 405–06. Under section 2254(d), 
the only relevant law is the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court’s decisions as of the time 
of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412. 
 216. Id. at 408–09. 
 217. Id. at 407–08. Williams also noted that a state-court decision may be deemed “unreasonable” 
if it “unreasonably extend[s] a legal principle from [the Court’s] precedent to a new context where it 
should not apply (or unreasonably refuse[s] to extend a legal principle to a new context where it should 
apply). . . .” Id.; see also Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000). 
 218. Williams, 529 U.S. 411–12. “[T]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define.” Id. at 
410. 
 219. Id. at 412 (emphasis removed). 
 220. Id. at 411. 
 221. This wrangling over the meaning of “unreasonable” may seem, at first glance, to be much 
ado about nothing: A straightforward application of the “contrary to” prong would seem to allow 
federal habeas courts to rectify incorrect state-court decisions; an incorrect decision is, after all, 
“contrary to” “the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases.” Id. at 405–06. But Williams refused 
to read “contrary to” in this seemingly obvious way. Instead, the Court narrowed the reach of the 
“contrary to” prong to cases in which state courts apply the wrong legal rule altogether or elide a 
precise fact analog. Id. In this way, the ostensibly clear connection between “incorrect” and “contrary 
to” is erased. 
 222. The shelter of reasonableness is always alluring. At the very least, it seems the best—and 
most realizable—way to “achieve, on average, a socially tolerable level of accuracy in the application 
of law to fact.” Fallon, supra note 23, at 311. For this reason, courts have used the language of 
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has long been muddled—if not positively “Byzantine and 
unfathomable.”224 The Court’s “unreasonably wrong” test seems, at first 
glance, to offer a promising response to a large part of that confusion.  
But Williams’ “unreasonably wrong” standard is a cure substantially 
worse than the disease. Far from resolving any of habeas’ age-old riddles, 
Williams complicates them, adding a number of new knots to an already-
tangled doctrine.225 
One of Williams’ new knots is its inadequate direction to lower courts. 
Williams may posit a novel “reasonableness” “constraint”; it may even 
describe what “unreasonable” does not mean.226 But there is little useful 
guidance in Williams’ negative definitions. In Williams, in fact, there is no 
“specific guidance” at all regarding “how [courts] should distinguish 
between reasonable and unreasonable [constitutional] errors.”227 There is 
only a (tacit) demand that inferior federal courts make that difficult—and 
crucial—determination themselves.228 
 
 
“reasonableness” liberally, nowhere more prominently than in the qualified immunity context. See, 
e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Scholars, in 
turn, have posited this “reasonableness standard” as a cure to functional constitutional problems. See, 
e.g., Kamin, supra note 57, at 7. 
 But “reasonableness” is no panacea. It often leaves courts in the position of under-enforcing 
constitutional rights—not because no constitutional violation occurred, but because the error was 
somehow unobjectionable. In taking its seemingly unobjectionable “reasonableness” step, in fact, 
Williams moves the courts from enforcing rights vigorously to enforcing very little at all. See Meltzer, 
supra note 32, at 2522 (“The reductio ad absurdum would be this: when habeas courts grant relief they 
are disagreeing with the state courts that upheld the conviction; when there is such disagreement, 
either position is presumptively reasonable; hence, every habeas petitioner necessarily . . . cannot 
obtain relief . . . .”). 
 223. Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 
485, 487 (1995) (measuring the Court’s habeas reform effort “by its own terms,” not “against an 
independent normative perspective”). 
 224. Id. at 486. 
 225. Some have gone so far as to describe the Williams’ fallout as an “intellectual disaster area.” 
Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1731, 1756 (2000). It is worth noting, 
too, that a host of (often labyrinthine) doctrinal mazes have developed in the habeas context, many in 
an effort to ameliorate AEDPA’s draconian flavor. See, e.g., Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) 
(discussing, inter alia, the meaning of “pending”). 
 226. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404. At first blush, this exegesis seems faithful to section 2254(d)’s 
text. Indeed, if Congress wanted a simple error-based standard, it could have said as much in the text 
of the statute. But this textualist argument only goes so far. Even if the text is our sole interpretive 
guide, the Court’s gloss is still dubious. To reach Williams’ end, one must presume that an incorrect 
decision is not “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court doctrine. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1999 
Term—Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 321–22 (2000). 
 227. Pettys, supra note 176, at 755 (citation omitted). 
 228. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000), announced only three weeks after Williams, 
leaves all of these methodological and etymological questions open. 
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Another of Williams’ knots is its curious theoretical pose, the Court’s 
strange blend of two notions of legal indeterminacy.229 In part, Williams 
implicitly disavows “the deterministic objectivism of formalism”230—the 
claim that all legal questions have a “right” answer231 and that this “right” 
answer can be discovered through Herculean feats of deductive 
reasoning.232 At the same time, Williams implicitly rejects the 
“indeterministic subjectivism of radical skepticism”233—the claim that 
legal questions have no objectively “correct” answers and that reasonable 
jurists will resolve difficult questions in radically different ways.234 
Somewhere between these two poles, Williams seems to suggest, sits a 
middle theory of indeterminacy, a perfect balance of “objectivism” and 
“subjectivism.” But Williams takes this intriguing suggestion nowhere; it 
offers no coherent theory of adjudication, no way to define that supposed 
balance.235 Instead, the Court asks a tautological question: “whether a state 
court’s application was objectively unreasonable.”236  
As Williams presents it, of course, this “objectively unreasonable” 
question is simply what Congress intended.237 If it is a tautology, the Court 
hints, it is one that the legislative history of section 2254(d) compels. 
 
 
 229. Professor Pettys contends—rather convincingly—that the Court rejects both in Williams. See 
Pettys, supra note 176, at 776. 
 230. See id. at 776–79. 
 231. See DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 106; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
pt. 5 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE]. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Pettys, supra note 176, at 734; see also id. at 779–85 (proposing a thoughtful, moderate 
version of “conventionalism” as a prospective theory of adjudication but conceding that a 
conventionalist approach provides scant guidance in “hard cases”). 
 234. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
 235. Not surprisingly, federal courts have struggled to fashion a workable solution to this riddle. 
See, e.g., Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 695 (5th Cir. 2001), reh’g granted, 264 F.3d 1149 (5th Cir. 
2001); Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing Williams), cert. denied, 
531 U.S. 944 (2000); Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 109 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 236. Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 237. In a short footnote, Williams contends that: 
The legislative history of § 2254(d)(1) also supports this interpretation. See, e.g., 142 Cong. 
Rec. 7799 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Specter) (“[U]nder the bill deference will be owed to State 
courts’ decisions on the application of Federal law to the facts. Unless it is unreasonable, a 
State court’s decision applying the law to the facts will be upheld”); 141 Cong. Rec. 14666 
(1995) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (“[W]e allow a Federal court to overturn a State court 
decision only if it is contrary to clearly established Federal law or if it involves an 
‘unreasonable application’ of clearly established Federal law to the facts”). 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 408 n.*. Senator Hatch’s remarks are hardly illuminating; they simply emphasize 
the text and disjunctive nature of section 2254(d)’s text. Senator Specter’s remarks seem, at first blush, 
more supportive of Williams’ position, but even this quote says less than it may seem. All Senator 
Specter denotes is “the application of Federal law to the facts.” He says nothing about the “contrary 
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But this reference to congressional motive is just another of Williams’ 
analytical knots. Congress’s intent is hardly as obvious as Williams 
casually suggests.238 The Court may do less, in the end, to implement a 
congressional plan faithfully than to subvert that plan, tipping a 
“compromise solution”239 heavily one way.  
Very little of this legislative “solution” need—or should—be revisited 
here. Some of habeas’ best scholars have already provided thoughtful, 
exhaustive accounts of section 2254(d)’s tortuous legislative path.240 Still, 
two of that path’s most significant turns merit brief consideration, if only 
to give context to the Court’s (mis)interpretation of section 2254(d) in 
Williams.  
The first turn came in the House of Representatives. In 1995, the House 
considered a proposal that would permit federal courts to grant habeas 
relief only where a state court decision was somehow “arbitrary or 
unreasonable”—whether in the interpretation of Supreme Court law or in 
the application of law to facts.241 The use of the word “arbitrary” troubled 
many in the House242—so much so that, to secure passage of the bill, the 
proposal’s sponsor excised the word. Under the bill passed by the House, 
 
 
to” prong of section 2554(d), and he says nothing about ratifying constitutional error. Some of his 
colleagues in the Senate were careful to do just the opposite. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 7792 (daily ed. 
Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“I believe the courts will conclude, as they should, that a 
constitutional error cannot be reasonable and that if a State court decision is wrong, it must necessarily 
be unreasonable.”). But cf. Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 112. 
 238. Of course, it never is.  See, e.g., ELY, supra note 10, at 136–42. 
 239. Yackle, supra note 35, at 422. 
 240. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 35; Tsen Lee, supra note 31; Meltzer, supra note 32; Liebman 
& Ryan, supra note 15, at 871–72; Scheidegger, supra note 38. 
 241. Representative Christopher Cox brought a new—though not entirely novel, see Yackle, supra 
note 35, at 432–34 (discussing the similarly-worded “Hyde Amendment”)—proposal for habeas 
reform. As drafted, the “Cox Proposal” read: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was decided on 
the merits in State proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation of 
clearly established Federal law as articulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States; 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable application of the 
facts of clearly established Federal law as articulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States; or 
(3) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State proceeding. 
Id. at 433 (citing 141 CONG. REC. H1424 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995)). 
 242. Id. at 435. 
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then, reasonable state court decisions could survive habeas review, even if 
wrong; arbitrary decisions could not.243  
Williams unmistakably echoes this “reasonable but not arbitrary” gloss 
on section 2254(d). Were Williams explicating only the House’s proposed 
section 2254(d), the Court’s “reasonableness” standard would surely be 
consistent with legislative intent—if still otherwise unsustainable.244 
But the path of section 2254(d) took another turn before passage, this 
one in the Senate. As it considered the House’s proposal, the Senate made 
a number of modifications to section 2254(d). Some of these alterations 
seem to be little more than quotidian editorial adjustments.245 But one of 
these alterations exhibits more than a fastidious concern for precise 
diction. The use of the disjunctive “or” between the “contrary to” and 
“unreasonable application” clauses illustrates a significant substantive 
concession, a careful and intentional effort to collapse the (supposed) 
distinction between “unreasonable” and “wrong” state court decisions.246 
This concession was a painful one for the Senate’s habeas detractors, 
critics who had had long sought247 to require federal courts “to defer to 
‘reasonable’ state court decisions on the merits—even if . . . the state 
judgment was in error.”248 But the concession was a real and necessary 
one; without it, AEDPA may not have survived the Senate249—a fact not 
lost on some of the more steadfast advocates of a “reasonableness” 
shield.250  
As it left Congress, then, section 2254(d) clearly required something: It 
demanded that federal courts take “serious account” of the relevant state 
court decision.251 But Congress’s final version of section 2254(d) did not 
plainly establish a “general rule of deference to ‘reasonable’ state court 
decisions on questions of federal law.”252 Nor did it clearly impart a 
distinction between “unreasonable” and “wrong” state court decisions.  
 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. See, e.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15. 
 245. Yackle, supra note 35, at 432–36. 
 246. See id. at 437–38. When viewed through a precise grammatical lens, the latter modification 
seems particularly clever. With a specific use of the disjunctive form, the Senate version seems to 
render the questionable “unreasonable” prong “superfluous.” 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 438. 
 249. Without these concessions, Professor Yackle concludes, the bill would have lacked sufficient 
votes for passage. Id. 
 250. Id. at 438, 422 (citations omitted); see also 142 CONG. REC. 7792 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996). 
 251. Yackle, supra note 35, at 383–84. 
 252. Id. at 384; see also id. at 443 (noting that such deep-kneed deference would constitute 
“flagrant interference with the federal judicial function”); see also Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15. 
The interplay of Williams and the “judicial Power” is discussed at length infra Part IV. 
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In Williams, however, this distinction reappears253—not through a 
simple elaboration of congressional intent or “gnomic congressional 
utterances,”254 but through a subtle judicial misinterpretation of section 
2254(d). In Williams, the Court installs an uneasy gap between “wrong” 
and “unreasonable”; in Williams, the Court compels deference to 
“reasonably unconstitutional” state-court decisions.  
D. Williams’ Course 
But how does the Court separate “wrong” from “unreasonable”? And 
how does Williams enforce this separation, requiring federal courts to 
defer to incorrect state court decisions?  
Williams does so, in short, through an impermissible decisionmaking 
model, its Swift-like unconstitutional course.255  
Like Swift’s course before it, Williams’ unconstitutional course 
proceeds in two steps.256 Under Williams, the federal court must first 
review the terms of the relevant state-court decision, asking whether that 
decision somehow errs as a matter of “clearly established”257 Supreme 
Court law. If there is no such error—i.e., if the state court correctly applied 
Supreme Court law to fact—the federal court’s analysis is at an end; there 
is no state-court error to remedy, so the habeas petition must be denied.258 
But if there is a state court error—if the state court did misapply law to 
 
 
 253. Yackle, supra note 35, at 432–36. 
 254. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 31–33 (2004) (noting that statutes often represent a “legislative strategy 
of generality and incompleteness,” the construction of a “broad legislative frame [that] . . . invite[s] the 
judiciary . . . to do much of the normative work”). 
 255. The focus here is section 2254(d)’s “unreasonable application” prong. 
 256. Each step is necessary—as is the order in which they proceed. To detect threshold error, 
federal courts must first ask if the state-court decided a federal question incorrectly; to determine if 
that error is “unreasonable,” federal courts must then attempt to quantify that error. See generally 
Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 855 (2005) 
(noting that this type of two-step decisional strategy informs qualified immunity, Fourth Amendment, 
and harmless error cases as well). 
 257. For a time, “clearly established” seemed to be a rather uncontroversial portion of section 
2254(d). It was, as Williams noted, a temporal limit, capturing only the “holdings, as opposed to the 
dicta, of th[e] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. 
at 412. In Lockyer v. Andrade, however, the Court seemed to add a clarity limit to the temporal one, 
concluding that the relevant principle must also be relatively easy to divine. See Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 
72 (2003) (“The difficulty with Andrade’s position, however, is that our precedents in this area have 
not been a model of clarity. Indeed, in determining whether a particular sentence for a term of years 
can violate the Eighth Amendment, we have not established a clear or consistent path for courts to 
follow.”) (citations omitted). In so doing, Andrade changes the relevant test dramatically. It also calls a 
great deal of the Court’s habeas jurisprudence into doubt, for very little of this doctrine can be 
described as a “model of clarity.” Williams, quite obviously, cannot. 
 258. Under no standard, of course, will a federal court upset a correct state court decision. 
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fact—the federal court’s analysis is not at an end. The federal court must 
instead attempt to quantify that error, to determine if the error is somehow 
“reasonable” and therefore worthy of deference.259  
A slight variation on a familiar case—Chambers v. Mississippi260—
offers a more specific illustration of how Williams’ two-step course works. 
As in Chambers, the central question in this example is the constitutional 
legitimacy of a Mississippi rule of criminal procedure.261 In this variation, 
however, Mississippi does not prevent all criminal defendants from 
impeaching their own witnesses.262 Instead, Mississippi permits a 
defendant to impeach his own witnesses—provided the defendant calls at 
least two additional witnesses to challenge the impeached witness’s 
credibility.  
During his criminal trial, Defendant D could not locate two suitable 
“additional witnesses” to impeach deceitful Witness W. As a consequence, 
Defendant D was convicted for an offense someone else had repeatedly 
confessed to committing.263 On state collateral review, Defendant D 
challenged his conviction, arguing that Mississippi’s “additional witness” 
rule conflicts with the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments.264 The 
Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed.  
In its decision, the Mississippi court readily acknowledges that 
Chambers renders the “additional witnesses” rule inherently suspect.265 
But Chambers also recognizes a state’s authority to bend the right to 
confront and the right to cross-examine when necessary “to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.”266 All the 
“additional witnesses” rule involves, the Mississippi court concludes, is 
 259. It bears emphasis that this hurdle is entirely distinct from AEDPA’s many plainly procedural 
limits (e.g., procedural default), all of which avoid or preempt consideration of the underlying merits 
question. 
 260. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). I use Chambers because of the relative paucity of Supreme Court 
doctrine (i.e., “clearly established” law) regarding this type of question. 
 261. Id. at 285. 
 262. Id. at 291–93. 
 263. Just as Mr. Chambers was. Id. at 290 n.3. 
 264. The challenges grow from the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause. Cf. United 
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 307–08 n.3 (1998) (“He also briefly contends that the ‘combined 
effect’ of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments confers upon him the right to a ‘meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense’ . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 265. As Chambers makes clear, the right of cross-examination is “implicit in the constitutional 
right of confrontation,” 410 U.S. at 295 (citing, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)), an 
“essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional 
goal.” Id. (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 266. Id. (noting that neither right is “absolute”—even if “its denial or significant diminution calls 
into question the ultimate ‘integrity of the fact-finding process’ and requires that the competing 
interest be closely examined”) (citations omitted). 
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this type of permissible bending; it does not violate the Sixth or the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
To challenge this conclusion, Defendant D files a federal habeas 
petition. The petition is not procedurally defective,267 so the federal court 
may reach the merits of Defendant D’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims. And on these merits, the federal court concludes that the 
Mississippi court misapplied the governing standard (viz., Chambers) to 
the facts—i.e., that the state court decision was wrong.  
Before the federal court may grant relief, however, Williams requires 
the court to ask a second question: whether the state court’s erroneous 
decision was also “unreasonable.”  
How the court is supposed to identify this “unreasonableness” is 
uncertain.268 But so, too, is the demonstrable “unreasonableness” of the 
Mississippi court’s decision. Expedient and wrong as the Mississippi 
court’s decision seems, it does not depend on an entirely unreasonable 
application of clearly established Supreme Court law. It merely depends 
on an incorrect application of that law, which is precisely the kind of state 
court error that Williams shields.269 
In the end, the federal habeas court may find that the Mississippi 
court’s decision was wrong and unreasonable; it may not. It may grant 
habeas relief; it may not. The answer to Williams’ second question surely 
matters—not least to Defendant D.  
But the very asking of that question matters as well, albeit in a less 
obvious way. It matters because asking Williams’ second question 
compels federal courts to reach outcomes in an impermissible manner: It 
requires courts to seek a kind of constitutional super-error, not 
constitutional error alone; it forces courts to answer tautological questions 
of “objective unreasonableness”; it orders courts to toe an indistinct line 
between “deterministic objectivism” and “indeterministic subjectivism”; 
and it ties the federal courts’ hands, preventing them from effectuating 
 267. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, & 2261–66 (2000). 
 268. See, e.g., Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 269. This logic leads in some rather troublesome directions. To make sense of our federalist 
system, one must assume that state courts are, in general, appropriate tribunals for federal questions. 
See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 876 (noting that state courts are, in theory, “entrusted [with] 
the . . . role of keeping state law in conformity with ‘the supreme Law of the Land’”); Scheidegger, 
supra note 38, at 903 (“From the beginning, it has been understood that state courts were competent to 
decide federal questions.”). But how much do we trust state courts? And does the fact that a state court 
has reached X conclusion make that conclusion de facto “reasonable”—no matter what the federal 
court decides? See Meltzer, supra note 32, at 2522. 
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their judgments—even after remediable “violat[ions of] the supreme law 
of the land”270 have been located.  
These problems do more than raise minor methodological concerns. 
They turn Williams’ decisionmaking process into an unavoidably 
unconstitutional endeavor, placing Williams-abiding courts on an 
unconstitutional course.271  
In this procedural sense, Williams is much like Swift: Each prescribes a 
specific, unconstitutional decisionmaking framework. Each directs the 
federal courts to reach outcomes in an impermissible way. 
On close inspection, however, Williams is less a perfect reflection of 
Swift than it is an unappealing image in photonegative. Where Swift 
impermissibly increased federal power, allowing federal courts to 
disregard state court decisions of state law, Williams impermissibly 
diminishes federal power, forcing federal courts to defer to state court 
decisions of federal law. And where Swift impermissibly expanded the 
“judicial Power,” allowing federal courts to create a body of general 
common law, Williams impermissibly shrinks that “Power,” requiring 
federal courts to cede their decisional autonomy and to defer to incorrect 
state court decisions.272  
These differences are neither trivial nor abstract. Under Swift’s course, 
means and ends maintained a healthy distance: Since Swift’s course left 
ample room for federal courts to “find” the “right” answer—if in the 
wrong way—there was no guarantee that some federal court outcomes 
would be constitutionally wrong.  
Williams’ course provides just that type of guarantee. Under Williams, 
there is no Swift-like decisional latitude, no room for federal courts to 
ensure correct constitutional outcomes. Under Williams, in fact, federal 
courts must stand ready to validate constitutional error.273 They must, on 
occasion, stamp the imprimatur of the federal courts on incorrect decisions 
 
 
 270. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 876, 881–84. 
 271. One might argue that the Court has placed a kind of “unconstitutional condition” on the 
exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction. See generally Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-
Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421–28 
(1989). As Professor Meltzer has thoughtfully reminded, however, the “unconstitutional condition” 
idea can only stretch so far, see Daniel Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 (1994) [hereinafter Meltzer, Harmless Error], and it does not apply cleanly here. 
 272. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 870–75. 
 273. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1777 (1991) (“[W]e do not dispute that Marbury v. 
Madison requires courts seised of jurisdiction to apply all relevant law and thereby avoid in-court 
violations of constitutional rights.”) (citations omitted). 
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of federal law274—not because no constitutional error occurred or because 
the error is of a type that cannot be remedied, but because the error falls 
into Williams’ purgatory, that constitutional nether-region in which 
“reasonably unconstitutional” state court decisions survive. This joins 
problematic means with problematic ends, running an unconstitutional 
course into unconstitutional outcomes. It also poses a serious threat to 
individual rights, to federal court integrity, and to the “judicial Power” 
itself. 
IV. THE “UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE” GOES ASTRAY 
To a skeptical eye, the last claim is a curious one. It is no small thing to 
suggest that a single Supreme Court decision raises questions about 
individual rights, federal court integrity, and the “judicial Power.” It goes 
even a step further to claim that the decision does so simply by crafting a 
seemingly innocuous decisionmaking framework.  
But Williams, through its carefully oblique unconstitutional course, 
does all of these things. This section examines a number of Williams’ 
doctrinal and deontological shortcomings. Subsection A explores 
Williams’ most prominent (if often overlooked) doctrinal impediment: the 
terms and limits of United States v. Klein.275 Subsection B follows with a 
brief discussion of how Williams’ model involves an unsound type of 
deference and an unsustainable separation of right from remedy. 
Subsection C then offers a preliminary consideration of Williams’ broader 
rights- and judicial integrity-based problems, concentrating primarily on 
the Court’s self-limiting misuse of the “judicial Power.” 
A. Williams and Klein 
United States v. Klein is a difficult case—not quite, as Professor Sager 
reminds, Fermat’s Last Theorem, but still far from “a model of clarity.”276 
Klein’s story begins with the Abandoned and Captured Property Act 
(ACPA), a Civil War-era bill designed to remunerate property owners in 
insurrectionary states for the forced-sales of their property.277 Under the 
APCA, Southern property owners could recoup the proceeds from these 
 
 
 274. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 873–74. 
 275. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
 276. Sager, Klein’s First Principle, supra note 21, at 2525. See also Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 
134 n.122; Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 922. 
 277. The Abandoned and Captured Property Act, 12 Stat. 820 (1863). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/1
p1679 Bloom book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES 1719 
 
 
 
 
forced-sales—provided those owners had offered no “aid or comfort” to 
the rebellion.278  
On its face, the APCA presented no steep problem of application. The 
express terms of the Act made loyalty to the Union a prerequisite to 
recovery. Participation in “any” type of insurrectionary activity proved, 
without more, that a property owner was disloyal. The only pressing (fact) 
question, then, was whether the particular property owner committed any 
insurrectionary deeds, i.e., provided any “aid or comfort.”  
But a presidential proclamation greatly complicated the operation of 
the Act’s seemingly simple “aid or comfort” standard. This proclamation 
extended to “persons who had been engaged in the rebellion a full 
pardon—specifically inclusive of the restoration of their rights of 
property—if they took and abided by an oath of allegiance.”279 In United 
States v. Padelford,280 the Court read this pardon to “cleanse[]” all oath-
takers of the sully of disloyalty;281 even more, the Court interpreted the 
taking of the oath to prove actual loyalty to the Union. All oath-takers, 
then, could recover under the APCA—including those, like Mr. Padelford, 
who had provided some “aid or comfort” to the rebellion.282 The APCA 
was thus turned on its head.  
Not surprisingly, Congress found Padelford entirely indefensible—
both in its treatment of presidential pardons and in its interference with the 
APCA. So, in response, Congress quickly passed three283 measures: First, 
Congress attempted to undo the evidentiary impact of the pardons, 
declaring pardons inadmissible as proof of loyalty; second, Congress 
attempted to subvert the very thrust of the pardons, deeming the 
acceptance of a pardon conclusive proof “that the recipient had given aid 
and comfort to the rebellion”; and, third, the Congress attempted to 
insulate its efforts from judicial review, divesting both the Court of Claims 
and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear cases in which the claimant 
had accepted a pardon—including those cases, like Mr. Klein’s, that were 
already pending.284  
 
 
 278. Id. 
 279. Sager, Klein’s First Principle, supra note 21, at 2525. 
 280. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. This act actually offers four measures, see Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235, 
but the second and the fourth steps run together, as both purport to tailor the courts’ jurisdiction in 
relevant cases. However many measures there are, any one of them may well have satisfied Congress’s 
desire. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 815, 817 (labeling Congress’s overlapping measures a 
kind of “belt and suspenders” response, a “redundant means” of accomplishing a Congress’s goal). 
 284. Id. 
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The Court rejected all three measures in Klein.  
An important part of Klein focuses on Congress’s failure to “give a 
presidential pardon the pervasive effect demanded by the Constitution.”285 
“[T]he President’s [pardon] power,” Klein explains, “is not subject to 
legislation; [] Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor 
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.”286  
But a more significant part of Klein touches on a different “separation 
of powers principle,” one relating to Congress’s interaction with the 
“Federal Judiciary,”287 not the Executive. This second separation of 
powers principle, Klein observes, precludes Congress from prescribing a 
“rule of decision” in a case already before a federal court.288  
Almost all congressional attempts to influence the outcome of 
pending—or already finalized289—legal actions raise judicial hackles.290 
Most are treated quite unkindly by the Court.291  
But the “rule of decision” in Klein took an unusually insidious form: It 
attempted to force the Court to disagree with its own still-viable 
constitutional precedent.292 Had Congress had its way, the Supreme Court 
would have been made to decide “against [the Court’s] own best judgment 
on matters within its competence”293—indeed, on matters already decided 
as a function of that “competence.” Then as now, the Court is acutely 
skeptical of this type of congressional tactic.294  
On its facts, Klein may now seem almost trifling, a relic of zealous 
postbellum politicking. But Klein is far from jurisprudentially trivial, even 
 
 
 285. See Sager, Klein’s First Principle, supra note 21, at 2526; Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147–
48; see generally Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 922 (suggesting that the statute’s “most glaring 
defect” was “its unconstitutional nullification of the presidential pardon”). 
 286. Klein, 80 U.S. at 141 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 287. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 329 (2000). 
 288. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146–47. One should be careful not to overstate this point. Congress has 
prescribed rules of decision in pending cases before, and, on occasion, the Court has found no 
constitutional problem in such rules. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 434–37 
(1992); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1944). The larger concern—in both Klein and 
elsewhere—is whether the federal courts are precluded “from attending to the Constitution in arriving 
at decision of the cause.” See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 775 n.362 (quoting Herbert 
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965)). 
 289. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). 
 290. See, e.g., Miller, 530 U.S. at 329. 
 291. Of course, “Congress tells courts how to decide cases, in a broad sense, every time it enacts a 
rule of substantive law.” Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 909 (adding that “[t]his power can even be 
exercised by enacting a rule so narrow that it applies only to one pending case”—like Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856)). 
 292. See Redish, supra note 22, at 715–16. 
 293. Sager, Klein’s First Principle, supra note 21, at 2529. 
 294. See, e.g., Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 211; Robertson v. 
Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
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if the facts seem historically quaint. At its core, Klein teaches that 
Congress may not demand that federal courts reach unconstitutional 
decisions.295 When Congress makes such a demand, it does more than 
exercise a valid legislative prerogative. It threatens the courts’ autonomy, 
their authority to decide cases “independently, finally, and effectively.”296 
Worse still, it forces the courts to be complicit in their own repudiation,297 
to act at “deep conceptual odds with [their] foundational understandings of 
the Constitution.”298 
These “conceptual odds” are no less insistent, no less constitutionally 
problematic, when dictated by an institution other than Congress. Klein’s 
primary lesson is that the federal courts should never be “put in the 
position” of reaching or validating unconstitutional outcomes.299 Nothing 
limits this principle to a specific inter-institutional dynamic; put more 
colloquially, nothing requires that Congress do the “put[ting].” 
Nothing should. Klein’s fundamental principle can—and should—
apply as readily to Supreme Court demands as it does to congressional 
ones. The principle can apply because the institutional dynamic is largely 
irrelevant; the focus falls on what the courts have been made to do, not 
who has made them do it. And the principle should apply because the 
 
 
 295. When placed in broader jurisprudential context, Klein also demonstrates that the greater does 
not always include the lesser: Congress may exercise significant control over federal court jurisdiction; 
it may even, on occasion, remove whole classes of cases from the purview of the federal courts. But 
Congress may not leave jurisdiction in place only to demand that the Court reach unconstitutional 
outcomes. See Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 954 (agreeing that Klein “actually does reject a greater-
includes- lesser argument”). See also Hart, supra note 20, at 1373 (“[I]f Congress directs an Article III 
court to decide a case, I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the 
court how to decide it.”); Lawson, supra note 11, at 201 (“Nor could Congress pass a general statute 
providing, for example, that in any case raising a question concerning the constitutionality of a statute 
restricting abortion, the court must rule for / against the plaintiff.”); see also RICHARD FALLON ET AL., 
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 368 (4th ed. 1996) 
(“[I]nvocation of the language of ‘jurisdiction’ is not a talisman, and . . . not every congressional 
attempt to influence the outcome of cases can be justified as the existence of a power over 
jurisdiction.”). It is worth stressing that these outcomes are not unconstitutional in some inchoate or 
impressionistic sense; they are unconstitutional in light of what the Court itself has already said. See 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2540 (1998) 
[hereinafter Congress] (“Congress may not compel the courts to speak a constitutional untruth.”). 
 296. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 773, 822; see also id. at 820 (“On the independent 
interpretation point for which Marbury is famous, but which it only silently decided, Klein is 
explicit.”); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“Even when a branch does not 
arrogate power to itself . . . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another 
in the performance of its constitutional duties.”). 
 297. See Sager, Klein’s First Principle, supra note 21, at 2529. 
 298. Sager, supra note 5, at 87–88; see also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (noting that courts should not 
be made to exercise their jurisdiction in “a manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of 
Article III”). 
 299. See Sager, supra note 5, at 88–89. 
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resulting jurisprudential “charade”300 is always the same: Federal courts 
have been allowed to address the merits of particular cases only to be 
compelled in some instances to reach incorrect (and unconstitutional) 
outcomes.301  
This “charade” is no less pernicious when directed by the Court. It is, if 
anything, only more so.302 Yet in Williams a version of this “charade” 
reappears—with the Court writing the script.303 Like Congress did in 
Klein, Williams precludes federal courts “from attending to the 
Constitution” in arriving at some of their decisions.304 In some cases, in 
fact, Williams affirmatively requires federal courts to validate incorrect 
(and unconstitutional) results—so long as those results are somehow 
“reasonable.” Unlike Congress’s efforts in Klein, however, Williams’ 
demand appears subtly, taking a misleadingly innocuous procedural form. 
But the demand is still an insidious one—even in its discreet guise.  
This guise is only more remarkable for the span of its influence. Under 
Williams, state courts may stray from binding Supreme Court authority, so 
long as they remain “reasonably” close to it.305 Federal courts, in turn, 
must stray from binding Supreme Court authority, ratifying “reasonably 
unconstitutional” departures from Supreme Court law. This is what 
Williams requires. It is also what Klein prohibits.  
B. Deference, Remedies, and How Williams is Worse 
This does not mean, of course, that Williams is a complete 
jurisprudential anomaly. In some ways, Williams even seems familiar: 
Federal courts often defer to other adjudicative bodies, whether judicial or 
 
 
 300. See Sager, Klein’s First Principle, supra note 21, at 2528. 
 301. Sager, supra note 5, at 88–89. 
 302. As Professor Fallon has noted, “[i]t would be pointless to uphold a constitutional right to 
judicial review when relief could not be granted even if the plaintiff should prevail on the merits.” 
Fallon, supra note 23, at 370. 
 303. This fact alone distinguishes Williams from the more typical “judicial Power” case. See, e.g., 
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 357–58 (“My subject is a common separation-of-powers claim: that a 
statute violates the constitutional grant of ‘judicial power’ to the courts.”) (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146–47 (1871), Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51, 54–57 (1932), Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), and 
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000)). 
 304. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 775 n.362 (citation omitted). 
 305. For a truly trenchant study of a similar pressure, see Daniel Meltzer, Harmless Error, supra 
note 271, at 5 (explaining that Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), is “best viewed as a rule of 
constitutional common law, born of the concern that state courts, if left free to apply their own 
harmless error standards, would dilute federal constitutional norms by too easily finding that 
constitutional errors were not prejudicial”). 
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administrative.306 Federal courts also leave some constitutional wrongs 
unremedied, both in the habeas context307 and outside of it.308 By these two 
analogical measures, Williams hardly looks unusual. Its deference to state 
courts may seem but an extension of a larger jurisprudential trend;309 its 
“reasonably unconstitutional” standard may seem to pry a preexisting 
rights-remedies gap only a bit wider.310 
But Williams’ “charade” is more than a reprise of things seen 
elsewhere. Williams’ deference, its conception of rights and remedies, its 
doctrinal disregard—all are unusual, and troublingly so.  
Williams does not, for example, demand deference to alternative 
tribunals of superior competence, as do certain parts of administrative law 
doctrine.311 Instead, Williams demands a ceding of federal court authority 
over federal questions (on the merits) to state courts312—none of which 
possesses any special decisional capacity. 
Nor does Williams demand a pardoning of “intermittent official 
misconduct,”313 as does qualified immunity. Instead, Williams demands a 
pardoning of state court judicial errors, an absolution of adjudicative 
mistakes made by state court judges.  
And Williams does not simply uncouple right from remedy—as federal 
courts sometimes do.314 Instead, Williams sketches a porous remedial line, 
 
 
 306. See generally Pettys, supra note 176, at 765–69. 
 307. Because of, e.g., AEDPA’s many procedural hurdles. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2244, 2261–66 
(2000). 
 308. Because of, e.g., qualified immunity. See Healy, supra note 256; Fallon, Some Confusions, 
supra note 23, at 311 (“The dictum of Marbury v. Madison notwithstanding, there is no right to an 
individually effective remedy for every constitutional violation.”). 
 309. See Woolhandler, supra note 30, at 636. 
 310. See Jeffries, supra note 57, at 87–88. 
 311. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See also 
Neuborne, supra note 58; Gary Peller, supra note 161, 691 (noting that the idea that “state courts are 
as solicitous of federal claims as are federal courts[] lacks support . . . ”); Jonathan Masur, A Hard 
Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005). 
 312. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 876 (discussing the “unconstitutional ‘decision[s]’ of . . . 
the ‘judges in every State’”). In our fictional version of Mississippi, for example, the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments do permit the additional witnesses rule. 
 313. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 876; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 
(1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982); Shank v. Naes, 773 F.2d 1121, 1125–26 
(10th Cir. 1985) (noting that courts do not expect police officers to make especially nuanced legal 
determinations); Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 314. To borrow Professor Woolhandler’s perfect summary, the “controverted issue is not whether 
there will be a gap between right and remedy, but rather, how wide that gap should be.” Woolhandler, 
supra note 30, at 636; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1799 (“[B]oth the Supreme Court 
and ‘inferior’ courts often resolve constitutional questions without providing relief.”). In the last 
decade, Professors Fallon and Meltzer have developed a “theory of constitutionally required 
remedies,” a framework that builds from two “general principles”:  
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prohibiting federal courts from employing a still-extant remedy in cases 
where that remedy is both available and appropriate.315  
It has long been clear that neither Congress nor the Court need provide 
the “best” remedy for every wrong.316 In the habeas context, there may be 
no constitutional requirement that petitioners receive any federal remedy 
at all.317 So, should the Court (or Congress) wish to redefine the 
underlying right or to modify the attendant remedy, it may well have the 
power to do so quite dramatically.318  
 
 
First, a strong though not unyielding presumption that there should be individually effective 
redress for violations of constitutional rights—a presumption that can be outweighed by 
practical imperatives; and second, a more general, but also more unyielding, structural 
principle that constitutional remedies must be adequate to keep government generally within 
the bounds of law. 
Meltzer, Congress, supra note 295, at 2559 (discussing Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1787–89 
(“Of the two functions performed by constitutional remedies, providing effective remediation to 
individual victims is the more familiar, but ensuring governmental faithfulness to law is, if not the 
more fundamental, at least the more unyielding.”) (citation omitted)). 
 Habeas relief has never fit comfortably within this “constitutionally required” frame, in part 
because of history, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1813 (“History marks federal habeas 
corpus as constitutionally gratuitous as a means of postconviction review.”) (citations omitted), and in 
part because of “the availability of other[]” remedial forms, see Meltzer, Congress, supra note 295, at 
2563 (“[T]he central point is that famously emphasized by Henry Hart—that the constitutionality of 
withdrawing particular remedies depends upon the availability of others.”) (citation omitted), however 
“aleatory” those other forms may be. Woolhandler, supra note 30, at 642 (“Presumably, if the state 
court provides postdeprivation process but inappropriately denies relief for such violations, the only 
federal court remedy for the loss is direct review in the Supreme Court, a remedy that is aleatory at 
best.”). See also John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2513, 2518–19 (1998) (“[T]he Court’s assumption is that although the Constitution contains 
rules of conduct for federal officers and identifies people who are entitled to some kind of judicial 
remedy for violations of those rules of conduct, the Constitution does not, by itself, resolve the 
question of the appropriate remedy.”); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution 
as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972). 
 315. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 370. 
 316. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Forward: Constitutional 
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). “The law of remedies,” Professors Fallon and Meltzer have 
reminded, “is largely conventional, and what counts as a full or adequate remedy is scarcely less so.” 
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1779–80 (citation omitted); id. at 1778 (asking if there must “be 
an effective remedy for every such violation—and if so, what, exactly, does ‘effective’ mean . . . ”); id. 
at 1787 (“Even in cases in which the Constitution requires some remedy, Hart showed that it 
frequently leaves an element of discretion or flexibility about what that remedy should be.”). 
 317. Id.; see also Woolhandler, supra note 30, at 636. 
 318. Compare Daniel Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2537, 2554 (1998) (arguing that Congress is not “the exclusive institution with authority to furnish 
distinctively federal remedies for constitutional violations”) (citation omitted), with Harrison, supra 
note 314, at 2519 (“The congressional power at issue under this analysis is the power to prescribe and 
limit the remedies available in federal court. The extent of Congress’s structural remedial power is 
quite important in the case in which Congress has power over the remedy but not over the cause of 
action.”). 
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But Williams changes neither the underlying right nor the attendant 
remedy, at least in a direct way.319 Nor does it rework the basic connection 
between the two. Instead, Williams leaves the right in place and the 
remedy largely unmodified—and then deems habeas sometimes 
different.320 Some violations of the Sixth Amendment, for example, will 
warrant habeas relief under Williams’ test; others will not.  
Worse than forcing habeas courts to treat analogous cases differently, 
this prohibits federal courts from effectuating a still-extant remedy in cases 
where that remedy is decidedly appropriate.321 What seems like a slight 
expansion of an existing right-remedy gap proves, in truth, a significant 
recasting of the meaning and effect of constitutional error overall—in 
some cases.  
C. Right Answers? 
So Williams suffers some serious flaws. But are Williams’ defects real? 
Are they meaningful theoretically and practically? Or do they depend on a 
hollow epistemological premise, an unsustainable belief that there is a 
“right answer” to be found—and that federal courts can find it?322  
Much has been written in the last half-century about the so-called 
indeterminacy thesis, the notion that legal questions have no correct 
answers—or at least unique correct answers.323 Some scholars advocate 
this indeterminacy thesis in its most potent form, arguing that the law 
inevitably fails to “provide concrete, real answers to particular legal or 
 
 
 319. And at no point does Williams proclaim that habeas is simply different, entirely sui generis in 
the realm of federal litigation. One might say, of course, that this observation gets us nowhere, that 
Williams simply does what Congress could have accomplished by statute. Congress could, the 
argument runs, demand “unreasonableness,” just as Congress could amend a statute—say, the Federal 
Tort Claims Act—to prohibit relief unless the relevant defendant’s conduct was reckless. Such a 
change in the FTCA may be bad policy, but it would not be unconstitutional—and Williams seems to 
do much the same thing. 
 But Williams and the “reckless” standard differ in at least one important way: The “reckless” 
standard changes the substantive reach of one particular law. Williams does far more: It leverages 
“reasonableness” to change the reach of countless provisions of substantive (constitutional) law, and it 
does so in a way that keeps courts from applying law as otherwise prescribed. This is the Klein 
problem. Even if Williams does not seem to prescribe a rule of decision in any particular case, it does 
prescribe a broader, more insidious “rule of decision” in a category of habeas cases—and that rule 
precludes courts from effectuating still valid constitutional precedent. 
 320. This inter-habeas split may be worse than divesting courts of their habeas powers outright, a 
move that would be both obvious and dubious for other reasons. 
 321. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 370. 
 322. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 157, at 446. 
 323. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 86–90 
(2004). 
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social problems.”324 Others stake a less doctrinaire position,325 suggesting 
that the law is only indeterminate where it would seem to matter most—to 
wit, in “important cases.”326 And some disagree with this indeterminacy 
premise altogether, depicting the law “as a seamless web” with one “right 
answer” for every legal question.327 
By now, the defects of this “right answer thesis” are well chronicled.328 
However viscerally powerful the right answer thesis may appear,329 even 
the idea’s modern architect seems to have withdrawn from it slightly, if 
not “jettisoned” it altogether.330  
But the flaws of the right answer thesis have not deterred the Court 
from accepting it, if in a manifestly indirect way. “Governing doctrine,” 
“controlling opinions,” “binding precedent”—these phrases may be little 
more than elements in a “conventional discourse,” empty words in cases 
 324. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462, 464 (1987) [hereinafter On the Indeterminacy Crisis] (citing, e.g., David Kairys, Law and 
Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 244, 247 (1984); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the 
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: 
Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985); Gary Peller, The 
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985)). 
 325. Id. at 488–91 (defining “weak” indeterminacy as the “claim that all interesting or important 
cases are indeterminate”). 
 326. Id. 
 327. See DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 331–38; DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 231, at ch. 5; 
RONALD DWORKIN, Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Banality in Pragmatism, in LAW AND 
SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 
137–43 (1991); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1759 (“Among contemporary jurisprudential 
writers, Ronald Dworkin might appear a spiritual heir to Blackstone. Like Blackstone, Dworkin 
depicts law as a seamless web, and he maintains that all legal questions have one right answer.”). See 
also LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 24–30 (1991); 
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 898 (2003) 
[hereinafter Dorf, Legal Indeterminancy]; Michael S. Moore, Remembrance of Things Past, 74. S. 
CAL. L. REV. 239, 246 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, Book Review, Truth, Justice, and the American 
Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 150–51 (1997). 
 328. See, e.g., Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 327, at 898–900; David Luban, The Coiled 
Serpent of Argument: Reason, Authority, and Law in a Talmudic Tale, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 
1270 (“Dworkin’s right-answer thesis, even if true, settles nothing.”). For a related critique, see 
Richard Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (1988), in which Judge 
Posner explores an “ontological skepticism” that impacts “legal factfinding [and] legal reasoning”—as 
well as “epistemological skepticism” that questions the existence of “invisible entities” like “justice” 
and “legislative intent.” 
 329. See, e.g., Charles Fried, A Meditation on the First Principles of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1227, 1243 (2004) (“I plead guilty as well . . . to being a long time adherent to what Ronald 
Dworkin over the years and in many essays has called the right answer thesis. . . .”). 
 330. Ken Kress, Book Review, Modern Jurisprudence, Postmodern Jurisprudence, and Truth, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1871, 1888 (1997) (book review) (“Even Ronald Dworkin, who famously proposed the 
controversial right answer thesis in his early work, has backed away from it—Joseph Raz claims he 
has ‘jettisoned’ it—in more recent writings.”). 
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where “reasonable minds” could disagree.331 But even in the most difficult 
of cases, the Court has long required inferior federal courts to locate “right 
answers”—to “plumb the nuances of settled authorities,” in Professors 
Fallon and Meltzer’s apt terms, “to reach ‘correct’ decisions.”332  
By this measure, Williams runs precisely the wrong direction: It 
implies that, “in hard and disputable cases,”333 federal courts cannot (and 
need not) find the “‘correct’” answer—or at least that they may not 
consistently enforce this “‘correct’” answer once they reach it. In so doing, 
Williams contradicts the federal court’s duty “to reach ‘correct’ decisions” 
on matters of substantive law, and it turns federal courts into (sometimes 
reluctant334) institutional critics of legal determinacy.  
But Williams also runs the wrong way without the “right answer 
thesis,” albeit in a less obvious manner. It may be true that many cases are 
“hard,”335 leaving courts without easy “right” answers. It may also be true 
that outcomes in these “hard” cases are truly indeterminate, leaving ample 
room for “reasonable” jurists to disagree.336 And it may even be true that 
this indeterminacy is of a moderated kind, leaving courts a “range” of 
“reasonable” outcomes. From all of this, it may follow that Williams 
strikes an epistemologically valid chord,337 landing safely between outright 
“determinis[tic] objectivism” and unfiltered “indeterministic 
subjectivism.”338  
But it does not follow that Williams’ epistemological shrewdness 
works—as a matter of constitutional law or otherwise. It does not follow, 
 
 
 331. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1748 (discussing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 
(1990)). 
 332. Id. at 1762. 
Practical concerns thus favor a conception of law and judging that calls for decisions to turn 
on the spirit of precedents, as best they can be understood, and that recognizes a judicial 
obligation of fidelity that extends beyond indisputable cores of settled meaning. . . . In other 
words, in the vast run of cases the Court joins Dworkin, Hart, and all but the most starkly 
positivist jurisprudential thinkers . . . . 
Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. See, e.g., Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 335. See Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis, supra note 324, at 470. 
 336. Id. 
 337. “After all,” Professor Bator tells us: 
[t]here is no ultimate guarantee that any tribunal arrived at the correct result; the conclusions 
of the habeas corpus court, or of any number of habeas corpus courts, that the facts were X 
and that on X facts Y law applies are not infallible; if the existence vel non of mistake 
determines the lawfulness of the judgment, there can be no escape from a literally endless 
relitigation of the merits because the possibility of mistake always exists. 
Bator, supra note 157, at 447. 
 338. Pettys, supra note 176, at 776–78. 
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in other words, that state courts should be empowered to resolve the 
“hard” cases, particularly on questions of federal law.339  
Some have persuasively argued, of course, that “state courts . . . are the 
primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be 
the ultimate ones.”340 If Congress retains “plenary power to limit federal 
jurisdiction,” the logic runs, it must also hold the power to “force 
proceedings to be brought, if at all, in a state court.”341 This seems an 
inevitable (if also “naïvely blind” and “unthinkable”342) extension of the 
Constitution’s federalist theme, at least when there is no federal court 
review.  
But when there is federal court review, state courts are not the 
“ultimate” arbiters of federal law. The “judicial Power” of Article III 
assigns that role to federal courts—even when the federal review takes 
habeas form.343 This “judicial Power” obligates federal courts to decide 
questions of federal law “independently, finally, and effectively.”344 In this 
sense, Williams turns the “judicial Power” on its head, inviting state courts 
to redefine the contours of federal rights.345  
 339. See Steiker, supra note 161, at 888 (noting that the “transformation” of the writ between 
1789 and 1868 “strongly supports the writ’s role in protection national rights in a national forum”). 
 340. Hart, supra note 20, at 1401. 
 341. Id. at 1363–64. 
 342. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 237–38 & n.112, 250 (1985). 
 343. This argument runs quite closely to the “federal right / federal forum” theory, the notion that 
all federal questions merit federal court review. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 157, at 507 (noting that, 
during a portion of his testimony before the Senate, Thurgood Marshall argued that “[f]ederal 
questions should be determined by the Federal judiciary”) (citation omitted); Fallon & Meltzer, supra 
note 273, at 1813 nn.454–56 (discussing the Court’s treatment of this theory). As Professor Meltzer 
has reminded, “the argument that federal rights should be litigated, sooner or later, in a federal forum 
can[not] alone carry the day.” Meltzer, supra note 32, at 2509. So perhaps there are federal questions 
appropriately deprived of federal review—at least in certain contexts. Once federal review begins, 
however, it should be real and convincing, even if that review takes habeas form. See Bator, supra note 
157, at 449 (“[T]here is no a priori reason why we should not decide that the most acceptable 
arrangement for the decision of such questions is that all such state-court determinations should be 
reviewed by a federal district court on collateral attack.”); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997); cf. Paul M. Bator, 
The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 636 (1981) 
(distinguishing direct and collateral review carefully). 
 344. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 773, 822. To say that state courts should have the final 
say on these questions is to argue for the end of modern habeas law, not for the putatively modified 
version of habeas Williams purports to offer. 
 345. There is plenty to say in favor of state court participation in adjudication of federal rights. 
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397–400 (1997) (discussing the 
states as laboratories of experimentation); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of 
Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213–14 (1998); but cf. Frank B. Cross, The 
Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903 (1994). But the famous 
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This process of redefinition may take place only at the margins—like 
Professor Monaghan’s famous “federalism ‘at the edges.’”346 But this 
process promises a profoundly negative end, one that risks fragmenting 
and diminishing constitutional rights. Since Williams strips federal courts 
of the power to correct “reasonably unconstitutional” state court decisions, 
it opens a window (however slightly) for state courts to “upset well-
defined expectations about the content” of federal rights.347 As this 
window opens, federal rights will come to mean (somewhat) different 
things in different states. The resulting “patchwork without pattern”348 will 
promise something worse than a tolerable level of rights-related 
inconsistency;349 it will promise a recalibration—and ineluctable scaling 
back350—of substantive rights, all through the mechanism of a deferential 
procedural model.  
There is, as Professor Vermeule has noted, a “mountain of scholarship” 
addressing the “common problem” of “legislative encroachment on 
judicial prerogatives.”351 Some of this scholarship recounts the Congress-
Court tension in meticulous detail.352 Some locates the Congress-Court 
dialogue in historical and social context.353 And some offers hopeful 
 
 
states-as-laboratories notion, however philosophically attractive, does not itself excuse a whittling 
away of the federal judicial power, nor does it permit a disregard of the Court’s authoritative 
interpretation of substantive constitutional provisions. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 343, at 
1362. 
 346. Monaghan, supra note 316, at 36. 
 347. Id. 
 348. ELY, supra note 10, at 146. 
 349. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
403, 428 (1996) (“From the earliest days of the nation’s history, no function of the Court has ranked 
higher than the protection of federal right from hostility or misunderstanding on the part of state 
courts.”); cf. Steiker, supra note 161, at 865 (“[T]here is some reason to believe that the Framers 
designed the Suspension Clause principally to promote federalism—to ensure that Congress would not 
interfere with the power of state courts to afford habeas relief to federal prisoners.”). 
 350. It is “wrong,” Professor Chemerinsky is careful to note, “to presuppose that decisions in 
favor of [individual liberties] are preferable” to decisions in favor of “government interests.” Erwin 
Chemerinksy, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
233, 258 (1988). But when state courts are permitted to stray from “clearly established” Court 
doctrine, the question is not whether rights should trump governmental interests. The question, rather, 
is whether rights have trumped government interests according to the Supreme Court. Williams does 
not simply invite state courts to draw unexpected shapes on a clean constitutional slate. It allows them 
to ignore the shapes the Court has already drawn, coloring outside preexisting lines. 
 351. See Vermeule, supra note 6, at 358. 
 352. See, e.g., Symposium, Exordium, Suspension and Supremacy, Judicial Power and 
Jurisdiction: The Availability and Scope of Habeas Corpus after AEDPA and IIRIRA, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 695 (1998) [hereinafter COLUM. L. REV. Symposium]; Symposium, Congress and the Courts: 
Jurisdiction and Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998) [hereinafter GEO. L.J. Symposium]. 
 353. Gunther, supra note 7, at 895–900. 
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solutions to this “common [inter-institutional] problem,” cures that often 
depend on the judiciary’s interest in self-protection.354  
There are no such cures when the Court opts to self-enervate. When the 
Court derogates its own powers—as it does in Williams—there are no 
clear solutions.355 At first blush, of course, Williams’ decisionmaking 
system may not seem to demand a solution; it may seem an innocuous, 
even irrelevant decisional form, a curious inversion of Swift’s over-
inflation of federal court power. But Williams’ structure is far from 
harmless.356 The integrity of the federal courts, the operation of those 
courts, the meaning of substantive-right guarantees—all are at increased 
risk because of Williams’ unassuming decisionmaking model, its 
unconstitutional course. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It has been a long time since Senator William King called the Supreme 
Court “our ‘Ark of the Covenant,’” our final “bulwark for the safety and 
protection of the States and the people.”357 It has been long enough, in 
fact, that political threats “to weaken or impair the power and the authority 
of . . . our judicial system” no longer “arouse grave apprehensions in the 
minds of all thoughtful Americans.”358 If anything, such threats now do 
precisely the opposite.359  
Of course, these threats rarely materialize. However noisy they may be, 
the calls to rein in “runaway” federal courts are almost always more smoke 
than fire.  
But smoke can be distracting, and it has obscured another potent hazard 
to the federal judiciary: the Supreme Court itself. In the last decade, the 
Court has itself “weaken[ed and] impair[ed] the power and authority” of 
the federal courts.360 It has done so by reshaping its own “judicial 
Power”—not through bold pronouncements or obvious doctrinal revisions, 
 354. See, e.g., COLUM. L. REV. Symposium, supra note 352; GEO. L.J. Symposium, supra note 
352. 
 355. “The Constitution [may] contemplate[] a judicial ‘check’ on the political branches,” Fallon & 
Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1788, but it envisions no structural “judicial ‘check’” on itself. 
 356. The “blinders” are no less troubling because the Court has “volunteer[ed]” to wear them. 
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 851. 
 357. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s 
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1041 n.317 (2000) (citing Court Change Foes Hold Senate Lead, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1937, at 15). 
 358. Id. 
 359. See Editorial, supra note 8. 
 360. Court Change Foes Hold Senate Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1937, at 15 (quoting Sen. 
William H. King). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/1
p1679 Bloom book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES 1731 
 
 
 
 
but through the prescription of unconstitutional decisionmaking 
procedures, the charting of unconstitutional courses. 
It is easy to gainsay the importance of procedure, to think of procedure 
as nothing more than a means to an (appropriate) end. But there is nothing 
trivial about unconstitutional courses. Some of these courses await full 
exploration. Qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment doctrine, for 
example, merit scrutiny through an “unconstitutional course” lens. Some 
courses capture important historical and philosophical moments. Swift’s 
course, for example, helps chronicle the rise and fall of a natural-law 
theory of jurisprudence.361 And some courses present real—if shrouded—
dangers to individual litigants’ rights, to federal court integrity, and to the 
“judicial Power” overall. Williams’ course, for example, ties this “judicial 
Power” in intricate knots.362  
These knots are real, but they are too readily overlooked. Their 
unexpected source and their subtle form make it too easy to ignore the 
Court’s unconstitutional courses. Yet where Congress has so often failed, 
the Court has quietly succeeded: By charting unconstitutional courses, the 
Court has refashioned the “judicial Power” in an untenable way.  
So there may well be a lesson in Congress’s long record of jurisdiction-
stripping failure. It may suggest that Congress’s persistent efforts are mere 
political theater. It may suggest that the federal courts are in no real 
danger, that the “judicial Power” is unthreatened. Or it may suggest that 
the “judicial Power” is indeed threatened—but that we have been too busy 
watching the wrong fight to notice. 
 
 
 361. See supra Part II. 
 362. See supra Parts III & IV. 
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